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I. INTRODUCTION
There was a particular five day period when one could see that
values had died in American law.1 Those five days were June 24 to June
*Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, Duquesne University School of Law.
This paper was prepared with support from the Duquesne Law School Summer Research Writing
Program.
1. There is an ambiguity in the title of this Article that I could not overcome. Despite the
title, I don’t mean that values died in American Law in June 1992, only that the death of values that
had already occurred became fully manifest during this five day period. As to when the death of
values actually occurred, I can only say sometime between the highly normative opinions in Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) and the five
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29, 1992. During those five days, the United States Supreme Court
decided Lee v. Weisman 2 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 3 Every
Justice on the Court joined either Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Lee or Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Casey. 4 In these
two opinions, all of the Justices ultimately agreed that normative
judgments are just human constructions. Future Justices of the Supreme
Court thereafter abdicated authority to set objective standards over a
wide range of issues, ultimately resulting in a regime of constitutional
law dominated by what I call here the death of values in American Law.
Isn’t this surprising? Avant garde law professors and postmodern
thinkers may make arguments about the non-foundational nature of
reality. But do we expect Supreme Court Justices to talk this way?
Consider the statement by the late Richard Rorty that “non-theists
make better citizens of democratic societies than theists” because nontheists believe “that agreement among human beings is the source of all
norms.” 5 Are we then to consider all nine Justices on the United States
Supreme Court to be functional atheists as of June 1992? If so, have we
law professors told this to our students? Have we acknowledged, in the
classroom, the arrival of nihilism?
These judicial statements are emblematic of where American law
and society stand today. Once the reality of nihilism is acknowledged, its
presence can be widely seen. The rest of this Article sets a wide frame to
do that. Part II of this Article provides the setting and the cases giving
rise to the death of values. Part III of this Article describes how the death
of values manifests in American culture generally and among law
days in June 1992 that I reference in this Article. Brown and Bolling reflected a strong, selfconfident, postwar American commitment to the good. Even the noted legal positivist, Robert Bork,
referred to Brown as “the greatest moral achievement of our constitutional law” in his opening
statement at the confirmation hearing for his nomination to the Supreme Court. See Bork
722
(April
13,
2005),
available
at
Confirmation
Battle,
CQPRESS
http://www.cqpress.com/incontext/SupremeCourt/bork_confirmation.htm. And Bolling, which
applied Equal Protection principles to Congressional racial segregation action without any
justification in Constitutional text or history, rested entirely upon the Court’s moral intuition: “In
view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated
public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on
the Federal Government.” 347 U.S. at 500.
2. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
3. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). It was Justice Scalia in
dissent in Casey who used the phrase “five days” in referring to Casey and Lee and the
jurisprudential implications of the two cases, thus leading me to use that image and that lens through
which to examine American law. See excerpt from Casey, infra Part II.
4. Technically, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part.
5. Springs et al, Pragmatism and Democracy: Assessing Stout’s Democracy and Tradition,
78 J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. 413, 419-20 (2010).
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professors. Part IV of the Article reflects the death of values in the
pattern of normative interpretation of rights in constitutional law. Part V
does the same with regard to the law of religious exemptions. In Parts VI
and VII, I examine how law copes with the death of values and the
darker implications of such coping strategies. Finally, Part VIII
identifies the death of values as a key component of the decline,
numerical and otherwise, in American law schools.
This wide-ranging Article is an acknowledgment of nihilism, not a
criticism. It was inevitable that even the heart of law would embrace the
subjectivity of values. So, I am not putting forward a theory of objective
values with which to confront the Justices. That is not needed or even
possible.
What is shocking is not that we have fallen into nihilism, but that
we accept our plight without qualm or worry. Therefore, what is needed
jurisprudentially is a new start in which the weight of the death of values
is felt. That much we owe to Nietzsche, who felt that weight. As Martin
Heidegger teaches us, “What is most inescapable and most difficult in
this overcoming [of nihilism] is the knowledge of nihilism.” 6
II. THE SETTING AND THE CASES
The first statement of the death of values in these cases was Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman, 7 handed down
on June 24, 1992. The majority opinion was joined by Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter. The majority struck down
graduation prayers at public schools.
There are two major themes in Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion—the coercion said to be present because of the importance of
graduation in the life of the student and the involvement of the public
school officials in giving a pamphlet to Rabbi Leslie Gutterman for the
preparation of nonsectarian prayer.
The school officials argued that a nonsectarian prayer—one that
would be “acceptable to most persons” 8—should be constitutional
because, unlike a prayer identifiable with a particular religion—a
reference to Jesus Christ, for example—a nonsectarian prayer would not
create problems of religious division. But Justice Kennedy found that the
very effort to encourage nonsectarianism involved the government in the
6. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY (OF THE EVENT), 110 (Richard
Rojcewicz & Daniela Vallega-Neu trans., 2012).
7. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
8. Id. at 589.
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forbidden activity of writing prayers. 9
Of more concern to us here than the holding is the meaning that
Justice Kennedy associated with nonsectarian prayers. Such prayers
could not be the work of government because they would assert the
reality of moral and ethical values:
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian
prayer, prayer within the embrace of what is known as the JudeoChristian tradition, prayer which is more acceptable than one which,
for example, makes explicit references to the God of Israel, or to Jesus
Christ, or to a patron saint. There may be some support, as an empirical observation . . . that there has emerged in this country a civic religion, one which is tolerated when sectarian exercises are not. If common ground can be defined which permits once conflicting faiths to
express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and a morality
which transcend human invention, the sense of community and purpose sought by all decent societies might be advanced. But though the
First Amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers
which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the government to
10
undertake that task for itself.

This passage had nothing to do with the particular prayers offered
by Rabbi Gutterman at the graduation in question. Those prayers raised
no clearly moral claims. 11 Rather, this passage views the claim that
9. Id. at 588.
10. Id.
11. These were the actual prayers:
INVOCATION
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men
and women grow up to enrich it. For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these
new graduates grow up to guard it. For the political process of America in which all its
citizens may participate, for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You.
May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust. For the destiny of America
we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they
might help to share it. May our aspirations for our country and for these young people,
who are our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled. AMEN
BENEDICTION
O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for learning
which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement. Happy families give thanks for
seeing their children achieve an important milestone. Send Your blessings upon the
teachers and administrators who helped prepare them. The graduates now need strength
and guidance for the future, help them to understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do
justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly. We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us
alive, sustaining us and allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion. AMEN.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 581-82.
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morality transcends human choice as religious in nature, thus raising
concerns about the establishment of religion.
This is the death of values in American law. If religion involves
claims about the independence of morality from the opinions of human
beings—an activity government may not “undertake”—then secular
instruments like law must not involve claims of moral objectivity. A law
like ours, which is necessarily based on secular sources, cannot make the
claim that values “transcend[] human invention.”
Actually, I am overstating Justice Kennedy’s commitment to the
objectivity of values even in the religious traditions. According to
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lee, nonsectarian prayer only expresses
“the shared conviction” that there is objective morality. Nonsectarian
prayer only “aspires[s]” to be that expression. In the view of the majority
in Lee, morality consists of claims that humans make that are not
resolvable by any method but some form of human choice.
The same view of moral claims animates Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, issued five days after Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion in Lee, on June 29, 1992. The context in Casey was the
political pressure the Supreme Court was experiencing as public
demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns were staged to influence
the Justices’ decision to uphold or strike down Roe v. Wade. 12
A number of the Justices were apparently upset by these public
political activities. But Justice Scalia went beyond criticizing these
political tactics as inappropriate. In his dissent, Justice Scalia laid the
blame for these political expressions at the feet of the majority of the
Justices, who were upholding the right to choose abortion in Casey. He
attributed the political pressure to the failure of these Justices to limit
their analysis of the abortion issue to purely legal materials and methods:
What makes all this relevant to the bothersome application of “political
pressure” against the Court are the twin facts that the American people
love democracy and the American people are not fools. As long as this
Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were doing essentially lawyers’ work up here—reading text and discerning our society’s traditional understanding of that text—the public pretty much left
us alone. Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to
demonstrate about. But if in reality our process of constitutional adjudication consists primarily of making value judgments; if we can ignore a long and clear tradition clarifying an ambiguous text, as we did,
for example, five days ago in declaring unconstitutional invocations

12.
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and benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies, Lee v.
Weisman . . . if, as I say, our pronouncement of constitutional law rests
primarily on value judgments, then a free and intelligent people’s attitude towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite different. The
people know that their value judgments are quite as good as those
taught in any law school—maybe better. If, indeed, the “liberties” protected by the Constitution are, as the Court says, undefined and unbounded, then the people should demonstrate, to protest that we do not
implement their values instead of ours. Not only that, but confirmation
hearings for new Justices should deteriorate into question-and-answer
sessions in which Senators go through a list of their constituents’ most
favored and most disfavored alleged constitutional rights, and seek the
nominee’s commitment to support or oppose them. Value judgments,
after all, should be voted on, not dictated; and if our Constitution has
somehow accidently committed them to the Supreme Court, at least we
can have a sort of plebiscite each time a new nominee to that body is
13
put forward.

To paraphrase Justice Scalia, only if lawyers’ work is technical and
objective will people turn to lawyers to do it. If the people knew that
legal interpretations are just value judgments, they would want to make
those judgments for themselves.
“Value judgments” are what you have if you are not doing lawyers’
work, that is, if you do not have objective standards of some kind.
Objective standards for Justice Scalia are things that can be counted and
measured—”facts” that have some kind of physical reality—like the
number of repetitions of high school graduation prayers throughout
American history or the number of states that prohibited abortion before
the Supreme Court decided Roe.
Even though they disagreed about the outcome in these two cases,
Justices Kennedy and Scalia did not disagree about ontology—that is,
they did not disagree about what is real. Claims of right and wrong, good
and bad, true and false, and beautiful and ugly are matters of human
opinion. Since Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas
joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in Casey, all nine Justices joined one or
the other of these opinions in June 1992, expressing a skeptical view of
moral reality.
Now let us turn to the opposite sides of each of these opinions to
see whether values were still living there. Values do not live in the
dissent in Lee. That dissent, also by Justice Scalia, was joined by Chief
13. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000-01 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting in part).
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, as his Casey dissent
would be five days later. Justice Scalia in his Lee dissent emphasized
that “the Establishment Clause must be construed in light of
‘[g]overnment policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and
support for religion [that] are an accepted part of our political and
cultural heritage’ [and] ‘the meaning of the Clause is to be determined
by reference to historical practices and understandings.’” 14
Justice Scalia then directly contrasted his emphasis on history with
what he called the majority’s philosophy: “Today’s opinion shows more
forcefully than volumes of argumentation why our Nation’s protection,
that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the
changeable philosophical predilections of the Justices of this Court, but
must have deep foundations in the historic practices of our people.” 15
The term “philosophical predilections” here functions the same way that
the phrase “value judgments” does in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Casey.
Justice Scalia alleges that the value judgments of the majority in each
case constitute subjectivism. But, then, why is not Justice Scalia’s
commitment to historical practices also a mere value judgment or
philosophical predilection? The acid of nihilism eats away everything.
In contrast to Lee, there was no total majority opinion in Casey,
opposite Justice Scalia’s dissent. But the crucial passage in the lead
opinion in Casey for purposes of confronting Justice Scalia’s view of
value judgments, did represent the majority view of Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Stevens, and Blackmun. This passage in the lead
opinion, however, did not contest the subjective aspect of value choice
but instead radically enhanced the claim of subjectivism.
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of person16
hood were they formed under compulsion of the State.

Value judgments are thus entirely subjective and personal for a
majority of the Justices in Casey. Like appeals to historical practices to
interpret the Constitution, this hyper individualism functions to avoid all
claims of truth. There is, instead of truth, “one’s own concept.” But, in
contrast to the language cited above, there was a point in the lead
opinion in Casey, a point at which it was joined by Justices Stevens and
Blackmun, in which something like a claim to truth was made. This part
14.
15.
16.
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of the opinion discussed the concept of stare decisis, the doctrine
concerning overruling past decisions, on the way to upholding most of
the right to abortion first announced in Roe. A majority of Justices stated
that sometimes the Supreme Court is justified in overruling a past case
but claimed that such reasons did not apply to Roe.
A majority of Justices in Casey described one of the celebrated
examples of justified overruling of a case—Brown v. Board of
Education, 17 which overruled Plessy v. Ferguson. 18 Brown was premised
on a new understanding of the facts concerning the social meaning and
effect of separate but equal treatment based on race. By 1954, it was
understood that segregation was a badge of inferiority, which the
majority in Plessy had denied. But a majority of Justices in Casey were
not content with this explanation because it would have suggested that
perhaps the Plessy Court had made only a kind of empirical mistake in
upholding racial segregation in 1896. So, citing the famous dissent by
Justice John Marshall Harlan in Plessy, the majority also wrote that “we
think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided.” 19
What did this assertion mean? In his dissent in Plessy, Justice
Harlan had contested the facts. He wrote that “[e]very one knows” that
the purpose of segregation was to keep blacks away from whites and not
the other way around. 20 There was nothing equal about separate but
equal.
But Justice Harlan also wrote that “[o]ur Constitution is colorblind,” 21 and called the majority decision “the wrong this day done,” 22
thus suggesting that the dispute in question was far deeper than any
sociological disagreement. His dissent amounted to a moral
condemnation of government imposed segregation. When Plessy was
finally overruled, the Court in Brown declared that “[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal,” 23 and it is that sense of the
injustice of government distributing benefits based on race that rendered
Plessy wrong from the beginning. 24
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19. Casey, 505 U.S. at 863.
20. 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 559.
22. Id. at 562.
23. Brown v. Bd. of Ed. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
24. Justice Harlan denied that the “injustice” of segregation necessarily rendered it
unconstitutional, (“However apparent the injustice of such legislation may be, we have only to
consider whether it is consistent with the constitution of the United States.”), but it is difficult to
read his dissent, with its final condemnation of the wrong done by the majority, and take this
declaration seriously. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553.
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Lawyers say things like “this case was wrongly decided” all the
time, and it is not clear exactly what is meant. 25 When lawyers say that,
we don’t mean that Plessy was wrong in the sense of using the wrong
method of interpreting the Constitution. It was not wrong, in other
words, for any technical reason that lawyers have special expertise
about. In fact, the outcome in Plessy was quite defensible on textual and
historical grounds since school segregation was enacted by the same
Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment. 26
Plessy was wrong the day it was decided because the system of
racial apartheid that it permitted was unjust. Plessy was morally wrong.
Because it was morally wrong—so very morally wrong—it could never
have been a proper interpretation of our Constitution. That is the
meaning of the “wrong” condemned by a majority of Justices in Casey.
But how could a majority of Justices in Casey be so sure of a moral
commitment like that after the death of values? It would appear that this
statement about Plessy is at odds with the view elsewhere expressed in
the opinions discussed above that value judgments are matters of human
construction.
I do not believe that there is a genuine commitment here to the
objectivity of values. What allows a value judgment about Plessy, as
opposed to most other matters, is simply historical consensus. The
problem with value judgments is that, because they are subjective,
disputes about them cannot be resolved. On the other hand, if everyone
agrees today that Plessy was morally wrong, the Justices are willing to
say so as well—however inconsistent that may be theoretically.
In response to the assertion by a majority of Justices in Casey about
Plessy, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Casey, did not, of course, suggest that
the value judgment about the wrongness of Plessy was something
subjective or something to be voted on. He simply agreed to Plessy’s
erroneous character without realizing—or not wishing publicly to
consider—that Plessy could easily have been justified based on the sort
of textualism, originalism, and tradition methods that Justice Scalia often
serves up as interpretation. 27
25. See generally, Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 677 (2005).
26. I am not criticizing recent efforts to defend Brown on originalist grounds. See Derek A.
Webb, Note, Getting Right With Brown: How Originalist Supreme Court Nominees Defend Brown
v. Board of Education, 9 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 563 (2011). Such a defense may well be possible.
But Plessy is still eminently defensible within the normal parameters of originalism.
27. Justice Scalia has acknowledged the problem of Brown for his originalist methodology
and calls criticism on that basis, “waving the bloody shirt of Brown.” Margaret Talbot, Supreme
Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40.
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So, yes, the Justices could assert with confidence that Plessy was
wrong, but only because they were actually asserting that the American
people believe that to be the case. Perhaps they would have liked to
assert more. But nothing suggests that they were asserting more.
Having shown the arrival of the death of values in law, the question
arises whether this phenomenon is a purely legal one. Of course, it is
not. The death of values practically defines American culture today.
III. THE CONTEXT OF THE DEATH OF VALUES IN AMERICAN CULTURE
AND AMONG LAW PROFESSORS
The death of values in law is a reflection of the phenomenon that
Nietzsche saw but could not overcome. Nietzsche’s death of God 28 is not
about a declining percentage of people attending places of organized
religious worship. Atheism could be rampant in churchgoers too.
Nor is atheism really the right word to describe the death of God.
The death of God referred not just to the Supreme Being of Christianity,
but to the metaphysical world of ideals—what people used to call the
Good, the True, and the Beautiful. And by dead, Nietzsche was not
taking a position about their existence, but about their potency. As
Heidegger wrote in an essay about Nietzsche, 29 the pronouncement
“God is dead” means that this ideal world “is without effective power.” 30
We can no longer build a civilization on these foundations. And that
means we cannot maintain one either. The right word for this is nihilism.
In nihilism, the certainty that some things are good or true or
beautiful died as well as God. It could no longer be assumed that one
thing was more significant than another or, indeed, that there was any
such thing as significance. There was no obvious answer to the question:
Why bother? Here is how Andre Comte-Sponville describes nihilism in
The Little Book of Atheist Spirituality: “What does nihilism mean? It
means that the higher values have depreciated; that the ends have
vanished; that there is no longer any answer to the question, ‘What’s the
use?’” 31

28. Nietzsche’s famous madman scene announcing the death of God can be found at
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 167, 181 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974) (1877). For my
earlier treatment of the implications of nihilism in law, see Bruce Ledewitz, Seeking ‘Common
Ground:’ A Secular Statement, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 49, 90 (2010).
29. Martin Heidegger, The Word of Nietzsche: “God is Dead” in THE QUESTION
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 53 (William Lovitt trans., 1977).
30. Id. at 61.
31. Andre Comte-Sponville, THE LITTLE BOOK OF ATHEIST SPIRITUALITY 203 (Nancy
Huston trans., 2006).
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Once the concept of a binding norm was lost, it was no longer
possible to assert with confidence that one action was inherently better
than another. Of course, a means to an end could still be judged as to its
effectiveness. But no end could be judged except as to its effectiveness
as a means to another, equally arbitrary, end. Reason itself, therefore,
became merely an instrument. As Charles Taylor writes in A Secular
Age, from the perspective of this ontology, any sense that we have of an
intrinsically higher demand, any phenomenology of universalism, must
be some form of delusion. 32
There is real harm to people in this valueless world. The sense we
have that it does not ultimately matter what we do is described by
Stephen Buhner in The Lost Language of Plants as “[t]he wound that
comes from believing we are alone amid dead uncaring nature.”33
The death of values has become widespread in popular culture. One
example will suffice to show the cultural spread of nihilism, an example
from a source that can serve as a barometer of this society’s
consciousness, especially among the educated elite. In episode 3 of the
2014 Cosmos series, Neil deGrasse Tyson, the narrator of the series,
asserts that before the rise of science, humans associated the arrival of
comets with momentous events, usually bad ones. A comet, in other
words, was a sign from some god. As Tyson put it, “They took it
personally. Can we blame them?” 34
Tyson was suggesting that ancient humans were mistaken. He calls
this mistake a matter of “false pattern recognition.” And there is a reason
for an error like this. Tyson says of human beings, “We hunger for
significance. For signs that our personal existence is of special meaning
to the universe. To that end, we are all too eager to deceive ourselves
and others. To discern a sacred image in a grilled cheese sandwich.”
This last comment was an off-the-cuff joke at religion’s expense.
But Tyson’s underlying claim has nothing to do with religion per se. It is
quite clear to Tyson, as it is quite clear to many educated people, that our
personal existence has no special significance for the universe. There is
no ultimate sense in which who we are and what we do matters. Nor
does anything else matter, from the cry of a child to the death of a star. It
might matter to the child or to any intelligent beings blown up along
32.
33.

CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 609 (2007).
STEPHEN HARROD BUHNER, THE LOST LANGUAGE OF PLANTS: THE ECOLOGICAL
IMPORTANCE OF PLANT MEDICINES TO LIFE ON EARTH 22 (2002).
34. Cosmos: A Spacetime Odyssey: When Knowledge Conquered Fear, (Fox Network
television broadcast Mar. 23, 2014). I took this quote, and the ones that follow, from replaying the
Cosmos series on demand. The reader is welcome to verify the quotes.
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with the star, but nothing matters objectively, inherently, and ultimately.
This is another way of saying that values are subjective.
Like the Justices in the prior section, Tyson does not always assert
that the universe is without meaning. In the last episode of the Cosmos
series, Tyson ends by declaring that human beings do science “because it
matters what’s true.” Does Tyson, then, believe that truth means
something special to the universe? Or, would he just like to believe that?
We also learn in the last episode of the series why Tyson is so
anxious to claim that humans are not of special significance to the
universe. 35 In that last episode, Tyson reframed Carl Sagan’s famous
“pale blue dot” monologue from the first Cosmos series. Sagan asked
NASA to take one last picture of Earth as the Voyager 1 spacecraft
passed Neptune. Then, in the original Cosmos series, and repeated in the
last episode of the new series, the viewer watches as Earth fades to what
Sagan calls the “pale blue dot.” The following is part of Sagan’s original
commentary, played anew, as we watch:
Our posturings, our imagined self-importance, the delusion that we
have some privileged position in the Universe, are challenged by this
point of pale light. Our planet is a lonely speck in the great enveloping
cosmic dark. In our obscurity, in all this vastness, there is no hint that
help will come from elsewhere to save us from ourselves.

When Sagan says humans are not special, he is hoping that human
evil will thereby be lessened. Unfortunately, Sagan is tragically mistaken
in this hope. Humans do not kill each other because they believe God
loves them especially. Humans kill each other because of our fear that
we are nothing. Nietzsche shared Sagan and Tyson’s view that we are
not special. Sagan’s “pale blue dot” is not an antidote to nihilism. It is its
birthplace.
Sagan must never have read how Nietzsche also described our
cosmic insignificance. If he had, Sagan would have experienced the
deep, disturbing chill of nihilism. Sagan would have heard his own
words with a far different resonance:
In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and glittering in innumerable solar systems, there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. That was the highest and most mendacious
minute of ‘world history’—yet only a minute. After nature had drawn

35. Cosmos: A Spacetime Odyssey: Unafraid of the Dark, (Fox Network television broadcast
Jun. 8, 2014).
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127
36

Aside from my few examples, it is not hard to see that the death of
values infects American life generally. Nihilism can be seen in all kinds
of social pathologies, from the decline in marriage to the decline in
work. New York Times columnist David Brooks calls these changes
“declining social capital.” 37 Others talk about the lack of social
discipline. According to the popular magazine Sports Illustrated,
“approximately 10 million American children have experienced parental
incarceration at some point in their lives.” 38 Even some sources of
economic inequality can be seen here. At one time, there might have
been embarrassment for a CEO in taking a large salary while the income
of workers stagnated. Such embarrassment has lost its motivating power.
There is one place where nihilism is especially visible and
especially harmful. In American politics everyone can see nihilism’s
acid at work in our partisan divisions. Despite the death of values,
people still want things and struggle to obtain them. This leads to
inevitable conflicts and, since there are no common norms and
commitments through which to evaluate these conflicts and resolve them
by pronouncing a binding judgment, political life becomes endless
fighting.
Yet, not everything is dark. There is another consequence of the
death of values that does not manifest in strife. As norms have collapsed
in America, a tolerance has grown that would have been unthinkable
fifty years ago. This tolerance is behind the rapid acceptance of gay
marriage, for example. It is part of the reason for the real decline in
racism in this society. Jesus said that we should not judge, 39 and young
people today really do seem to practice that. “Whatever,” they say.
But even this result is fundamentally just more nihilistic acid. Is
tolerance all that gay people have a right to expect? Frederick Douglass
once demanded on behalf of people of color, not benevolence, sympathy
or pity, but “‘simply justice.’” 40 What about justice for gay couples?
That is the proper foundation for gay marriage rather than tolerance.
There are voices now in the gay community that are challenging
36. Frederich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth_and_Lie_in_an_Extra
-Moral_Sense.htm.
37. David Brooks, The New Right, NEW YORK TIMES, June 10, 2014.
38. L. Jon Wertheim, Carrying the Burden, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 29, 2014 at 66.
39. Matthew 7:1.
40. Quoted by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US 306, 349-50
(2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
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tolerance as the foundation for gay rights very much along these lines,
most notably Suzanna Walters, in her new book, The Tolerance Trap. 41
The proper response to the claim by some religious practitioners
that homosexual love is immoral is not to say, “That is only your
opinion.” The proper response is to say, “You are mistaken, and here is
why.” 42 This distinction is why Austin Dacey, in his book, The Secular
Conscience, urged his fellow secularists not to abandon moral claims. 43
But, in the reign of the death of values, this is easier said than done.
Law professors are part of this culture and also manifest its
nihilism. We law professors in our writing and teaching bring the culture
of nihilism into the law.
To see the effect of the death of values among law professors,
consider a 2008 symposium that was held at Pepperdine University to
discuss the concept of higher law. At one time, the existence of higher
law would have been taken for granted. It was part of the ideal world
that Nietzsche saw had ended. At a later point in legal development,
there would have been a debate over higher law, with positivists
asserting that there is no such thing and advocating that law be evaluated
according to ends that can be measured, such as economic efficiency or
even forms of morality. But, revealingly, some of these positivists, like
H. L. A. Hart, were careful not to deny that objective morality existed,
whatever that might have meant to them. Hart fully defended the
commitment that there could be a moral obligation to disobey an unjust
law. 44
By 2008, however, the context had changed. The title of the 2008
symposium was, “Is There a Higher Law? Does It Matter?” 45 This title
represents a new stage, in which it can credibly be asserted that even if
higher law exists in some sense, it might not matter. Now, we cannot be
confident that anything matters. In fact, the symposium might just as
well have been entitled, “Does Anything Matter?”
41. SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS, THE TOLERANCE TRAP: HOW GOD, GENES, AND GOOD
INTENTIONS ARE SABOTAGING GAY EQUALITY (2014).
42. The Supreme Court also was unable ultimately to speak the language of morality about
gay marriage. See the discussion of Obergefell v. Hodges, infra Part IV.
43. AUSTIN DACEY, THE SECULAR CONSCIENCE: WHY BELIEF BELONGS IN PUBLIC LIFE
(2008).
44. Hart defended Austin and Bentham from the criticism that the separation of law and
morals, which they and he propounded, would lead to general obedience to immoral law, by
attributing to them the view that “if laws reached a certain degree of iniquity then there would be a
plain moral obligation to resist them and to withhold obedience.” H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 617 (1958).
45. See generally, Symposium: Is There A Higher Law? Does it Matter?, 36 PEPP. L. REV.
463 (2009).
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The spirit of the death of values was caught earlier in law, by Art
Leff, in the chilling poem with which he ended his 1979 law review
article, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law:
All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we have. Given what we
know about ourselves, and each other, this is an extraordinarily unappetizing prospect; looking around the world, it appears that if all men
are brothers, the ruling model is Cain and Abel. Neither reason, nor
love, nor even terror, seems to have worked to make us “good,” and
worse than that, there is no reason why anything should. Only if ethics
were something unspeakable by us could law be unnatural, and therefore unchallengeable. As things stand now, everything is up for grabs.
Nevertheless:
Napalming babies is bad.
Starving the poor is wicked.
Buying and selling each other is depraved.
Those who stood up and died resisting Adolph Hitler, Joseph Stalin,
Idi Amin, and Pol Pot—and General Custer too—have earned salvation.
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned.
There is in the world such a thing as evil.
[All together now:] Sez who?
God help us.

46

Of course, in this section, I am not describing anything unique to
law professors. Leff’s last line—God help us—carries an uncanny echo
to a late saying of Heidegger in his 1966 interview in the German
newsweekly Der Spiegel—an interview I doubt Leff had read—that
“[o]nly a god can still save us.” 47
A few years after Leff’s poem came out, in 1984, William Singer,
on behalf of the Critical Legal Studies movement, launched his critique
of legal theory’s claims to objectivity, rationality and neutrality in the
shadow of nihilism, but with a great deal of hope in a pragmatic law that
would free us to embrace “passionate moral and political
46. Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1249 (1979).
47. Der Spiegel interview with Martin Heidegger (1966), available at
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~other1/Heidegger%20Der%20Spiegel.pdf. Heidegger insisted that the
interview not be published during his lifetime. It appeared in the magazine on May 31, 1976, five
days after Heidegger’s death.
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commitments.” 48 A mere sixteen years later, Bush v. Gore, 49 a case in
which liberal Justices embraced conservative positions and conservative
Justices embraced liberal positions, all in the service of partisan
politics, 50 thoroughly vindicated everything Singer had advocated. After
Bush v. Gore, no one would seriously claim that law is objective,
rational, and neutral.
Singer was wrong, however, in his expectations of what would
follow. In hindsight, it turns out that nihilism is not the easily managed
insight that Singer had imagined. When nihilism really takes hold, when
law embraces it, those passionate moral and political commitments
become vicious, unending and unyielding, rendering human solidarity
and dialogue unattainable. We see this in American political divisions,
as mentioned above. But law itself now mimics politics in its endless
controversies. Under nihilism, strife is inevitable because there is no
standard—no norm—that could supply a nonarbitrary starting point in
the search for values that could ground law, and by extension, ground
our public life together. 51
A recent example of law professor nihilism is the reaction to the
method of statutory interpretation utilized in Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion in King v. Burwell, the end-of-the-term case that upheld
Affordable Care Act subsidies on federal insurance exchanges in the
face of statutory language limiting subsidies to “an exchange established
by the State.” 52 The majority opinion held that this apparent meaning
would contradict the purpose of the Affordable Care Act and therefore

48. Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
L.J. 1, 9 (1984).
49. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
50. Speaking only of the majority Justices, but I believe applicable to a certain extent as well
to the dissents, Alan Dershowitz called the decision “the single most corrupt” in Supreme Court
history on the basis of the partisan nature of the holdings and result. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ,
SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 174 (2001). Rick Garnett
has reminded me, however, that the charge of shape-shifting in pursuit of predetermined and
partisan result does not apply to the concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas. The emphasis in the concurrence on Art. II, §1, cl. 2 as granting authority to
legislatures, as opposed to state courts is just the kind of strict textual reading that those three
Justices might uphold in any case.
51. In one of those “what goes around, comes around” moments, I heard the same Professor
Singer on a panel at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the AALS on January 3, 2015, speak favorably of
“better law” analysis, the pursuit of justice and conflicts rules in his current role as one of the
nation’s leading experts in conflicts of laws. Of course, these are heavily normative concepts whose
metaphysical weight is increasingly undermined by the death of values that Professor Singer once
welcomed.
52. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
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rejected that interpretation of the language. 53
In a short opinion piece, John McGinnis defended Chief Justice
Roberts against the charge that his majority opinion represented an
unprincipled commitment to upholding the Affordable Care Act 54—as
the Chief Justice had done once before on what some considered a
strained interpretation of the taxing power. 55 McGinnis argued that the
Chief Justice was using a well-established method of statutory
interpretation and was not writing a merely result-oriented opinion.
Nevertheless, McGinnis argued that Chief Justice Roberts was
wrong in his conclusion for two reasons. First, the Affordable Care Act
is a veritable kitchen soup of purposes and a mess of process. It is
impossible to assign such a poorly drafted statute a well-defined
purpose. Chief Justice Roberts even acknowledged this problem in the
King opinion. 56
But the more fundamental reason that Chief Justice Roberts was
wrong is that—and here McGinnis was relying on the work of Mark
Movsesian 57—it is inappropriate in general to rely on purpose when
interpreting a statute. As opposed to a contract representing the
intentions of two persons, “[F]ederal legislation is a product of 535
legislators plus the president. It’s hard to distill an overriding intent or
purpose from such a collection of wills, particularly in complex statutory
schemes.” 58 Therefore, the judge should rely wholly on the objective
meaning of statutory language.
To understand the depth of this challenge to collective rationality,
note that both Movsesian and Justice Scalia, who makes a similar
argument concerning statutory interpretation in his book, A Matter of
Interpretation, 59 rely heavily on Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 60 in which the Supreme Court refused to apply the expansive
language of a federal statute banning the importation of foreign labor to
the contract of an Anglican Church and a priest. Both Movsesian and
53. Id. at 2491.
54. John O. McGinnis, John Roberts’s Principled Mistake, CITY JOURNAL, http://www.cityjournal.org/2015/eon0629jm.html.
55. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
56. “The Affordable Care Act contains more than a few examples of inartful drafting.” King,
135 S. Ct. at 2492.
57. Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”? The Failure of the
Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145 (1998).
58. McGinnis, supra note 54.
59. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
60. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
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Justice Scalia argue that the Justices in that case were substituting their
personal preferences for the objective meaning of the statutory language.
But even if one grants that this is what occurred in Holy Trinity,
why is that one example supposed to be so persuasive? After all, there
are many examples of reasonable judicial interpretations that seem to
further the purposes of statutes straightforwardly and noncontroversially.
Why is one counter example so important?
The answer lies in the word “wills” in McGinnis’ piece above. 61
The problem with the statutory interpretation method of purpose is not
that occasionally a judge will make a mistake, but that every use of the
method ends up applying the policy preference of the judge because
there is no such thing as a collective purpose. There is only individual
will, which by its nature cannot be collective.
That is why this challenge to King v. Burwell illustrates the death of
values—it is a recapitulation of the nihilism of Margaret Thatcher, who
once insisted that “there is no such thing as society. There are individual
men and women, and there are families.” 62 Individual will is the ultimate
reality. Large numbers of people cannot share a purpose.
Put that way, these criticisms of purpose seems absurd. Of course
people join together to further great enterprises like the abolition of
slavery or the fight against fascism. And, of course, overall evaluations
are possible, such as “social security achieved its goal of ensuring that
the elderly would not be destitute.”
But, no. McGinnis accurately reflects the cynicism of public choice
theory and the general skepticism with regard to rationality as anything
other than means-end. He is reflecting the death of values. And the
immediate responses that I raise above are just the residue of an earlier
moral age.
Although this challenge to statutory interpretation is usually voiced
by conservatives, I believe its premises are quite widespread. Only
satisfaction with certain judicial results from the application of
legislative purpose—as in King itself—keeps law professors on the left
from agreeing with McGinnis.
Is there any alternative view in the legal academy? It might be
61. McGinnis, supra note 54.
62. Epitaph for the eighties? “there is no such thing as society”, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Oct.
31, 1987, http://briandeer.com/social/thatcher-society.htm. Other than sentimentality, I don’t know
why Thatcher stopped with families as collective entities. Justice Brennan was willing once to say
that there are no families, only the association of individuals: “[T]he marital couple is not an
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with
a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
Unfortunately, the tidal wave of divorce renders this a self-fulfilling prophecy.
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argued that one major voice among law professors contested the death of
values. Shortly before his death, in writing about religion, Ronald
Dworkin argued strongly that values are objective. Ronald Dworkin’s
last book, Religion Without God, 63 demonstrates his long-standing
commitment that religion is not a matter of belief in God and is a
broader category than American law has generally viewed it. He writes:
“Religion is a deep, distinct, and comprehensive worldview: it holds that
inherent, objective value permeates everything, that the universe and its
creatures are awe-inspiring, that human life has purpose and the universe
order.” 64
But unlike Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lee, above, Dworkin
argues that religion is for all of us, not just for believers in God. For
Dworkin, the belief that a God underwrites objective value “presupposes
a prior commitment to the independent reality of that value. That
commitment is available to nonbelievers as well.” 65 Thus, for the
nonbeliever as well as for the believer, values “are as real as trees or
pain.” 66
Here could be a response to Art Leff’s poem. Look to the stars,
Dworkin would say to Leff. They neither spin nor reap, yet they are
arrayed in loveliness. How can you say, among all this beauty and order,
that everything is up for grabs? So, is the death of values solved? Can
we turn to Dworkin’s assurance to address the death of values?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. Dworkin was convinced, following
David Hume, that an ought—a norm, or for our purposes, a value—
cannot be deduced from an is. 67 Yet, Dworkin’s entire book is actually a
demonstration of deriving an ought from an is. The universe is
objectively inspiring of awe. Therefore we ought to feel awe. Dworkin
does not acknowledge this. All he says is that we can experience awe.
Contrary to Dworkin, a universe that is objectively awe-inspiring—
as a fact—thereby contains the norm that Dworkin insists we cannot get
to. As C.S. Lewis put this very point, the norm is that the universe is, in
fact, deserving of awe. 68 What Dworkin does not see is that the
63. RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013).
64. Id. at 1.
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id. at 13. These concepts of objective values might be in some tension with Dworkin’s
criticism of objective value as a “noumenal metaphysical fact” in Dworkin’s book Law’s Empire,
but that matter is beyond my scope here. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 81 (1986).
67. DWORKIN, supra note 63, at 26-27.
68. “Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be such
that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or incongruous to it—
believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could merit, our approval or disapproval,
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objectivity of values he propounds depends on deriving an ought from
an is. That is the necessary foundation of objective values.
It was because Hume did not endorse Dworkin’s kind of value
objectivity that Hume held that an ought could not be derived from an is.
Hume held that the mere fact that God exists is not a reason to worship
and obey Him. But Hume would not, and could not, have said that the
existence of a God who is objectively deserving of awe and reverence is
not a reason to grant Him awe and reverence. It precisely would be such
a reason. Dworkin’s would-be ontology of objective values is at war
with his skeptical epistemology. The declared inability to derive an
ought from an is, actually is the death of values.
The state of affairs I am describing generally in our culture is
dissatisfying to people. Postmodern thought does not, because it cannot,
abolish the human thirst for real and lasting justice. Even a postmodern
legal theorist like Helen Stacey knows this: “The deep longing for
justice that comes from within our present epistemology remains the
central concern to any legal analysis of events that is framed by a
postmodern approach.” 69 But, postmodern thought, which subscribes to
and celebrates the death of values, cannot satisfy that thirst.
Postmodernism asserts that freedom, which, in the absence of
objective morality, becomes its dominant value, can serve as the basis of
society even without truth. It is said with some pride that we have
“subvert[ed] the concept of truth and . . . replace[d] it with the concept
of freedom.” 70 But this has led us to fruitful pursuit of neither freedom
nor truth because the only authentic human freedom is the freedom to be
free for truth, whether this is the truth of God, the truth of Being or the
truth of reality itself. Freedom, isolated from a goal inherently
worthwhile, is just will and drift. This drift is the posture of the death of
values.
Thus far, we may conclude that values in American law did indeed
die in June 1992, as a part of a larger undermining of values in the
culture and among the legal academy. But, what of it? What impact did
the death of values have in law, and what impact does it continue to
have? In the rest of this Article, I will show how the death of values
grounds American constitutional development. Indeed, the death of
our reverence, or our contempt.” C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN; OR, REFLECTIONS ON
EDUCATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH IN THE UPPER FORMS OF
SCHOOLS 9 (1947).
69. HELEN M. STACY, POSTMODERNISM AND LAW: JURISPRUDENCE IN A FRAGMENTING
WORLD 15 (2001).
70. Id.
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values may be the hidden fulcrum of American constitutional law.
IV. THE REFLECTION OF THE DEATH OF VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION OF RIGHTS
The effect of the death of values may be seen in continuing
difficulties in the interpretation of rights. We are not like the Framers of
the Constitution. They believed that rights were real, while we do not.
Because of this difference, it is difficult for us be faithful to the project
of the Framers in creating constitutional government.
This difference between the founding generation and legal
interpreters today is most obvious in our view of the Ninth Amendment,
which provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.” The Ninth Amendment could only have been written by
persons who lived in a value-filled universe in which rights were not a
matter of opinion, not a gift from government, and not grounded even in
popular sovereignty. The Framers would not have agreed with the
criticism by Robert Bork that the Ninth Amendment is like an inkblot
that would allow judges to “make up constitutional rights,” 71 nor with
the assertion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist that if the Bill of
Rights were repealed, Americans would not have those rights. 72 For the
Framers, rights were not made up. And rights were not dependent on
attaining written form in any document.
This conclusion is not lessened in any way by suggestions that the
Ninth Amendment was intended to reinforce the limited enumeration of
federal powers 73 or to protect rights already set forth in state
constitutions from federal interference 74 or that the rights protected in
the Ninth Amendment corresponded to common law rights. 75 These
71. See Ramesh Ponnuru, Judge Bork’s Ink Blot, NATIONAL REVIEW,
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/336142/judge-borks-ink-blot-ramesh-ponnuru.
72. See Bruce S. Ledewitz, The Questions Rehnquist Hasn’t Had to Answer, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 7, 1986 (quoting from a 1980 speech by Justice Rehnquist). For a different
view of Rehnquist’s position on these matters, see Richard W. Garnett, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
Enduring, Democratic Constitution, 29 HARV. J. L.& PUB. POL’Y 395 (2006).
73. Kurt T. Lash, The Sum of All Delegated Powers: A Response to Richard Primus, The
Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 180, 198 (2014) (“The Ninth Amendment in
particular prevents the addition of enumerated rights from impliedly undermining the general
principle of limited enumerated power.”).
74. See Wilfred J. Ritz, The Original Purpose and Present Utility of the Ninth Amendment,
25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 4 (1968) (quoting criticism of the Constitution by Brutus, an
Antifederalist writer).
75. See Andrew King, Comment, What the Supreme Court Isn’t Saying About Federalism,
the Ninth Amendment, and Medical Marijuana, 59 ARK. L. REV. 755, 764 (2006) (“Under
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claims may be true, but they would not be exhaustive. They would not
be exhaustive because, in the view of the Framers, any right not yet
established in a state constitution or recognized at common law would
still be protected by the Ninth Amendment. 76 The Framers did not have
to artificially narrow the potential application of the Ninth Amendment
because they were not haunted by moral skepticism.
Because we don’t today believe in rights the way the Framers did,
we either have to treat the Ninth Amendment as if it referred to the
existence of ghosts and therefore ignore it, to use John Hart Ely’s
famous example, 77 or give the Amendment the sort of democratic
procedural and anti-discrimination meaning that Ely ultimately gave it.
The consequence of our skepticism is that we would assume that anyone
invoking the Ninth Amendment to ground a substantive right must be
utilizing a subjective value judgment because we believe there is no
other kind of value judgment that can be made.
But the Ninth Amendment is too easy a case. The implication of the
death of values in its interpretation is almost too obvious to mention.
The overall effect of the death of values on the interpretation of
rights is to suppress substantive normative judgments in favor of
procedural and equality norms even when the text of the Constitution
seems to require substantive interpretation. I will illustrate this tendency
in a short comparison between the Supreme Court’s interpretations of
procedural due process and free speech—both a kind of procedural
norm—and the failure of the Court to interpret the substantive
constitutional concepts of cruelty and life, in the Eighth Amendment and
the Due Process Clauses, respectively.
The promise of procedural due process has a solid textual
foundation in the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment applies to the
actions of the federal government and provides as follows: “[N]or shall
any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” The Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to State

Blackstone’s tutelage, a colonial American understood that natural rights were an inextricable part
of the common law, ‘the birthright of the people of England.’”). The Framers expressed this
understanding when they wrote the Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment.
76. To this effect, Daniel A. Farber rightly quotes a supporter of the Constitution at the
Pennsylvania ratification convention—”our rights are not yet all known”—in an online excerpt from
his book, Retained by the People: The ‘Silent’ Ninth Amendment and the Constitutional Rights
Americans
Don’t
Know
They
Have
(2007),
http://www.alternet.org/story/50404/the_%27silent%27_ninth_amendment_gives_americans_rights
_they_don%27t_know_they_have.
77. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 38-39
(1981).
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and local government, provides similarly, “[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”
The interpretation by the Justices of procedural due process—the
question whether a person receives a hearing before losing welfare
benefits, for example—has been extremely free-wheeling in terms of
history and text. The Justices do not worry about what the Framers
thought due process might require, or what the Framers thought due
process applied to, or what the public meaning of “due process” was
when the texts were adopted, or even what the history of procedural due
process was after the adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Neither text, nor history, nor tradition have had much, if any, influence.
Instead of all that kind of analysis, which forms the major part of
constitutional interpretation when substantive constitutional provisions
are at issue, the Justices have adopted an interpretive approach that has
nothing to do with text and history. First, the Justices ask whether the
government benefit of which the claimant is being deprived constitutes a
liberty or property interest. 78 Then, once the Justices conclude that
liberty or property is involved, they openly balance the weight of the
private interest against the weight of the government’s interest, in light
of the risk of a decision-making error without the proposed procedural
innovation. 79
In terms of free speech, the right at stake is not entirely procedural.
The First Amendment, which, despite its wording, has been applied to
state and local government as well, provides that “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” Justice Louis
Brandeis, for example, certainly believed that freedom of speech was
more than an instrumental value. Brandeis wrote in his concurrence in
Whitney v. California that freedom of speech constitutes a “means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.” 80 But he
also wrote that:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed lib81
erty to the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.

This would appear to be a substantive vision of free speech as
78.
79.
80.
81.
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Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Id.
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constitutive of a good life.
Perhaps the two approaches to free speech—instrumental as a path
to truth and substantive as a way to live—are not all that different.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose encomium to “the competition of
the market” as “the best test of truth” in his dissent in Abrams v. United
States 82 is as close as we have to an official ideology of free speech,
joined Justice Brandeis’ Whitney concurrence after all.
Nevertheless, when I call free speech procedural, I mean that the
Justices do not themselves make any judgments about truth. Even though
free speech may constitute a substantive aspect of a fulfilling human life,
the judicial interpretation of free speech does not reach any such
substantive claim. As Justice Lewis Powell put it in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.: “Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea.” 83 The Justices see their job in applying the constitutional
norm of freedom of speech as keeping the lines of communication open
so that, in good Holmesian fashion, all ideas will be present so that
others—the people, in democratic terms—can decide what to believe
and how to live.
This vision of free speech accords very well with the death of
values because the Justices never proclaim that any idea is true or false.
The only basis for excluding speech from constitutional protection
becomes something like an immediate threat of specific criminal
action 84or demonstrable harm in the preparation of the speech, as in
child pornography. 85 No idea, even the advocacy of genocide or the
denial of the holocaust, can be punished as simply untrue.
This free speech interpretive approach is almost as devoid of text,
history, and tradition as is the analysis of procedural due process. One
example of this absence is Citizens United v. FEC, which held that
corporate political speech is constitutionally protected. 86 Despite some
preliminary skirmishing between Justice Scalia’s concurrence and
Justice Stevens’ dissent over the Framers’ view of corporate speech,
Justice Scalia’s conclusion that the “First Amendment is written in terms
of ‘speech,’ not speakers” 87 is not really a textual or historical argument
at all. The reason that corporate speech is protected is the Court’s own
understanding of the meaning of free speech, and the protection of
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) for the classic formulation of this test.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 392 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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corporate speech would not be reversed even if it could be shown
conclusively that the Framers disagreed with that perspective. 88 Justice
Scalia put the matter as follows, in dissent, the first time the Court
upheld political spending limits on corporations:
The Court today endorses the principle that too much speech is an evil
that the democratic majority can proscribe. I dissent because that principle is contrary to our case law and incompatible with the absolutely
central truth of the First Amendment: that government cannot be trust89
ed to assure, through censorship, the “fairness” of political debate.

This “absolutely central truth of the First Amendment” is obviously not
thought by Justice Scalia to be a value judgment that must be voted on.
This general commitment by the Justices decides free speech issues
rather than text, or history, or tradition.
Another example of the theory of free speech independent of text,
history, or tradition was the treatment of laws punishing the burning of
the American flag. In a pair of controversial cases striking down laws
that punished burning the American flag in protest demonstrations, 90 it
was of no interest whatever to the majorities of the Justices that the flag
might have received legal protections historically. The Justices believe
they know, inherently, what free speech means. Despite Justice Scalia’s
criticism of the concept in his dissent in Lee above, that meaning of free
speech is “a philosophical predilection[].”
I don’t mean to suggest that the Justices believe they are violating
the intentions of the Framers of the First Amendment in any of the free
speech cases. Rather, the Justices proceed in their interpretations from a
very strong theoretical commitment as to the meaning of free speech,
and that meaning is practically irrefutably presumed to be shared by the
Framers. 91
88. This is not mere surmise on my part. Justice Scalia’s disdain for arguments raising the
Framers’ view of free speech was on display in Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729
(2011), in which he wrote the majority opinion invalidating a California statute prohibiting the sale
or rental of violent video games to minors. Justice Thomas argued in dissent that the “founding
generation . . . believed parents to have complete authority over their minor children and expected
parents to direct the development of those children.” Id. at 2758 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Therefore,
minors do not have the right of free speech. Justice Scalia did not refute this historical argument but
mainly countered that such an interpretation would allow the government to forbid minors from
attending political rallies or church without parental permission. Id. at 2736, n. 3. Thus, for Justice
Scalia, the theory of free speech trumps originalism.
89. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679-680 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
90. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
91. I am not trying to show in this section that history is irrelevant to constitutional
development outside the realms of substantive normative judgments, only that history and other
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Now, contrast the treatment of procedural due process and the
treatment of free speech with two substantive questions in constitutional
law—what is a cruel punishment and whose life is protected by the
Constitution? On these questions, there turns out to be little or no
independent judgment by the Justices, who depend on various objective
indicia to decide these issues.
Unlike the unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment, these
terms—”cruel . . . punishments” and “persons”—are in the Constitution,
in the same way that “due process” and “free speech” are in the
Constitution. Since that is so, there is no obvious reason for any
difference in approaches to their interpretation. Yet, these substantive
values are interpreted very differently.
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” My focus here is on cruel and unusual
punishments. This language could have been interpreted as a term of art,
meaning that it might have had no effect at all other than eliminating
some of the more extreme forms of ancient common law sanctions that
had already fallen out of use, or were in the course of doing so, in
America prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights—sanctions such as
branding, mutilation, and the use of the pillory and the stocks. 92
But the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments did not
turn out to be restricted to such historical practices. In 1958, in Trop v.
Dulles, 93 the punishment of deprivation of citizenship of a native-born
American citizen for wartime desertion was struck down. There was no
majority opinion in the case. Chief Justice Earl Warren, speaking for
four Justices, appealed to “the dignity of man” and “the principle of
civilized treatment.” 94 He added that the meaning of the Amendment is
not static and “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Because of the
utterly defenseless position of the expatriate—who has lost “the right to
objective factors are crucial in avoiding such judgments. Besides procedural due process and free
speech, there are other constitutional provisions that are interpreted quite loosely with respect to
history. Regulatory takings are another example, as is the right to bear arms. While the opinion in
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), contained substantial originalist argument about the nature of
the right to bear arms, the actual scope of that right—no concealed weapons, no possession by
felons and no entry to sensitive areas—perfectly matched the policy needs of the Justices who wrote
and joined the majority opinion and had little justification in history.
92. On the other hand, as Justice Brennan pointed out in Furman v. Georgia, whipping and
earcropping were still “quite common” when the Eighth Amendment was adopted. 408 U.S. 238,
263 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
93. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
94. Id. at 99.
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have rights”—and because “[t]he civilized nations of the world are in
virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment
for crime,” expatriation is forbidden. Warren added that the death
penalty could not stand as an “index of the constitutional limit on
punishment” such that nothing less than death could be unconstitutional.
The death penalty is a special case because of its historical sanction and
widespread use.
Trop could have ushered in a judicial examination of the concept of
human dignity and its relation to cruelty, but it did not do so. Part of the
reason for that is the word “unusual” as a limiting term. For example, in
Harmelin v. Michigan, in 1991, the Court upheld mandatory prison
sentences, partly on the ground that “[s]evere, mandatory penalties may
be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been
employed in various forms throughout our Nation’s history.” 95
But even apart from the word unusual, the Justices simply would
not give any serious content to the meaning of cruelty. This reluctance
became clear when the Justices came to consider the constitutionality of
the death penalty per se, in Furman v. Georgia in 1972 96 and Gregg v.
Georgia in 1976. 97 In Furman, all American death penalties were held
unconstitutional, though there was no majority opinion. Justices Potter
Stewart and Byron White voted to strike down the death penalty as
currently imposed because of the vagaries in the death penalty system
and the infrequency of its imposition. Justice Stewart captured this
feeling with the observation that:
[t]hese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random
98
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.

When reformed death penalty statutes came before the Court four
years later, a guided discretion statute was upheld in Gregg, 99 while new
mandatory death penalty statutes were struck down. 100 As long as

95. 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (this portion of the lead opinion represented the Opinion of the
Court).
96. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
97. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
99. Guided discretion statutes were upheld the same day that Gregg was decided, in
Florida—Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)—and Texas—Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976).
100. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
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sentencing juries and judges could consider mitigating factors in
individual cases, the death penalty was held not to be cruel per se, since
it comported with contemporary public opinion and served the
traditional social purposes of retribution and deterrence. According to
Justice Stewart’s lead opinion in Gregg, human dignity is satisfied by
traditional punishments with the caveat that “the sanction imposed
cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in the
gratuitous infliction of suffering.” 101 But since the unconstitutional
common law penalties had, of course, themselves been inflicted in good
faith in the sense that the authorities believed that they served legitimate
penological functions, Stewart’s approach was actually not an
interpretation of the meaning of human dignity. Something renders those
punishments unconstitutionally cruel even though they served
penological purposes, but we are not told what that is. 102
In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court would decide more
specific cruel and unusual challenges to the death penalty and related
challenges to penalties imposed on juveniles. In a series of cases, the
Justices held that the death penalty could not be imposed on persons
with mental retardation,103 that the death penalty could not be imposed
on persons under the age of 18 at the time of the crime, 104 that the death
penalty could not be imposed for non-homicide crimes against
individuals, 105 that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole (LWOP) could not be imposed on a juvenile for a non-homicide
crime, 106 and that a mandatory LWOP sentence could not be imposed on
a juvenile even for a homicide. 107
These cases rested generally on a purported lack of proportionality
viewed through objective indicators of Trop’s “evolving standards of
decency,” such as the small number of states that impose certain
penalties and the infrequency with which the penalties are carried out,
that are said to show a national consensus against the practice in
question. 108

(1976).
101. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion).
102. All Justice Brennan could say in his concurrence in Furman is that “[n]o one, of course,
now contends that . . . branding and earcropping, which were common punishments when the Bill of
Rights was adopted” are still constitutional. Furman, 92 S.Ct. at 2249. (Brennan, J., concurring).
103. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
104. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
105. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
106. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
107. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (plurality opinion).
108. See Id. at 2463, 2470.
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Although these majority opinions relied heavily on objective factors
and precedent, Justice Kennedy was careful to point out in Kennedy v.
Louisiana that the Justices’ “own judgment” on the acceptability of the
death penalty must also be brought to bear. 109 But that judgment was
limited to such matters as excessiveness and arbitrariness, which are not
only objective but quasi-procedural. Nowhere in this case-law is there
any thoughtful discussion of what constitutes the cruelty that violates the
dignity of man. In that sense, everything about these cases is based on
the objective factors of a supposed national consensus.
It remained for the dissenters in these Eighth Amendment cases to
point out that there is in fact no national consensus supporting these
decisions, that they actually must thus rely on substantive moral
judgments, and that these moral judgments are not justifiable since there
is no such thing as a defense of a moral judgment. The opening of
Justice Thomas’ dissent in Graham is representative:
The Court holds today that it is “grossly disproportionate” and hence
unconstitutional for any judge or jury to impose a sentence of life
without parole on an offender less than 18 years old, unless he has
committed a homicide.
Although the text of the Constitution is silent regarding the permissibility of this sentencing practice, and although it would not have offended the standards that prevailed at the founding, the Court insists
that the standards of American society have evolved such that the Constitution now requires its prohibition.
The news of this evolution will, I think, come as a surprise to the
American people. Congress, the District of Columbia, and 37 States allow judges and juries to consider this sentencing practice in juvenile
non-homicide cases, and those judges and juries have decided to use it
in the very worst cases they have encountered.
The Court does not conclude that life without parole itself is a cruel
and unusual punishment. It instead rejects the judgments of those legislatures, judges, and juries regarding what the Court describes as the
“moral” question of whether this sentence can ever be “proportionat[e]” when applied to the category of offenders at issue here.
I am unwilling to assume that we, as members of this Court, are any
more capable of making such moral judgments than our fellow citizens. Nothing in our training as judges qualifies us for that task, and

109.
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Justice Thomas, who has no trouble believing that majorities of
voters might be willing to censure free speech unconstitutionally, cannot
fathom that those same voters might be willing to treat unpopular
criminals in a cruel fashion. Thus, for Justice Thomas, free speech is
permitted to upend totally settled practices, such as the regulation of
corporate political speech, whereas in the realm of substantive morality,
legislatures must be accorded determinative weight.
Undoubtedly, the Justices in the majority in Graham agreed with
Justice Thomas’ ontological premise, which is why objective factors
loom so large in the majority opinion. Under the death of values, no one
is “any more capable of making” a moral judgment than is anyone else,
and all moral opinions are entitled to equal weight. It follows that no
such judgment can actually be right or wrong, and so Justice Thomas
need not even attempt to show that the majority’s judgment is mistaken.
All this is so even though the prohibition against cruel punishments is
specifically given into the care of the judiciary.
A second example of the failure of substantive judgment is the
status of unborn children. The Due Process Clauses referred to above as
protecting liberty and property in procedural cases, also protects “life.”
But not all lives are protected; in each Amendment, only the life of a
“person” is protected. 111
While it is often argued that due process is not a substantive
protection, but only a procedural one, everyone agrees that this is not so
with regard to the protection of life. A legislative decision that actually
puts the lives of citizens at risk requires extraordinary justification. So, a
draft in wartime is constitutional only because of the legislative
judgment that the nation is at serious risk. But a law that allowed one
citizen to kill another without the second person’s consent would
undoubtedly be unconstitutional as a violation of the constitutional
protection of life.
This principle formed a background question when Roe v. Wade
was argued before the Justices. If an unborn child is a person for
purposes of due process, then it is, as Justice Stewart put it, “almost an
impossible case” to argue for a constitutional right to choose abortion. 112
110. Graham, 560 U.S. at 97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
111. The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life . . . without
due process of law . . . .” The Fourteenth Amendment provides “nor shall any State deprive any
person of life . . . without due process of law . . . .”
112. Transcript of oral argument of Roe v. Wade 41 (December 13, 1971),
http://assets.soomo.org/ag/transcripts/roe-v-wade.pdf.
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In fact, as Justice Stewart also pointed out during oral argument, if the
fetus is a person, then a liberal abortion law—he used the law of New
York State as an example—is “grossly unconstitutional” because it does
not protect the lives of the unborn sufficiently.
As Michael McConnell has written, the question of who is a person
under the Constitution should have been unavoidable in Roe and had to
have been answered as a substantive political judgment:
Society has no choice but to decide to whom it will extend protection.
It is not helpful to call this decision “private,” for there is no more inherently political question than the definition of the political communi113
ty.

Justice Blackmun’s Opinion for the Court in Roe conceded this point:
The appellee . . . argue[s] that the fetus is a “person” within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this,
they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant’s
case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be
114
guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.

But, instead of answering this question by either accepting or
confronting these “well-known facts of fetal development,” Justice
Blackmun sidestepped the question in a fashion familiar from the
interpretive strategies of textualism and originalism. Justice Blackmun
argued in effect that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
intend the word “person” to reach the unborn and that the public
meaning of the word at that time would not have included the unborn.115
And when Texas argued that, even apart from the question of
personhood, the State should be permitted to protect the human life of
the unborn child if it chose to do so, Justice Blackmun contended that
the “difficult question of when life begins” could not be answered with
any certainty. 116
The majority opinion in Roe is thus not, as it is often described, a
decision dependent on the non-enumerated right of privacy. The right of
a woman to choose a surgical procedure is certainly a form of liberty
113. Michael W. McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1198 (1991).
114. Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973).
115. Id. at 157-59.
116. Id. at 159 (“When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of
man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”).
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that was appropriate to protect given the prior case law. But the
determinative question in Roe was the State’s purported justification for
denying that right. And that justification failed because no substantive
moral judgment about the status of the unborn child could be justified.
So, the right to choose an abortion is premised on moral skepticism
and, more generally, on skepticism about truth itself. That is what
allowed the Justices to hide from the question of whether an unborn
child is a human being. The law of abortion is a function of the same
death of values that devalues “value judgments” in general.
The widespread acceptance of the death of values among the
Justices explains why there are no pro-life votes on the Supreme Court
today. Not one Justice is willing to hold that unborn life is human life
and that the fetus is a person for purposes of constitutional protection.117
Even for judicial opponents of Roe, there is no willingness to make the
moral judgment that the fetus is a human being. Thus, while disagreeing
about whether Roe should be overturned, left and right agree on the
death of values.
Given the significance of the result, the question naturally arises
whether Obergefell v. Hodges,118 the recent case that constitutionalized
gay marriage, represented a renaissance in value-laden decision-making.
One certainly would have expected that, given the prevailing echoes of
the highly normative civil rights cases that surrounded the litigation—
Brown, Bolling v. Sharpe, 119 and Loving v. Virginia. 120 And, if Justice
Kennedy, the author of the majority opinions in both Lee and Obergefell,
117. Justice Stevens made the point in Casey in 1992: “no Member of the Court has ever
questioned this fundamental proposition” [that] “as a matter of federal constitutional law, a
developing organism that is not yet a ‘person’ does not have what is sometimes described as a ‘right
to life.’” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part). And this remains true to this day. No Justice on the Court has
ever supported personhood for the unborn.
118. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
119. See e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Campaign for Southern Equality and Equality Federation
in Support of Petitioners, 2015 WL 1048449 (“In the context of the lives of the politically
powerless—including gay Americans—this Court has a proud tradition of exercising its
Constitutional authority when a controlling majority ‘identifies persons by a single trait and then
denies them the possibility of protection across the board.’ Indeed, in the past, when political
majorities disregarded the constitutional rights of political minorities, this Court has intervened to
protect them.”) (internal citations omitted). See also, Stuart Gaffney, The Anticipation Builds,
MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA (Jun. 9, 2015), http://www.marriageequality.org/anticipation_builds
(noting Justice Kennedy’s comment during oral argument in Obergefell to the effect that
“approximately the same amount of time has elapsed between the Supreme Court’s landmark LGBT
rights decision in Lawrence and the current cases as had elapsed between Brown v. Board of
Education and Loving, two of the Court’s landmark race discrimination cases.”).
120. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For the normative underpinnings of the civil rights cases, see note 1,
supra.
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had written a normatively oriented opinion, then one might question the
prior analysis of the Lee opinion, or at least acknowledge that Lee is not
the whole story.
Obergefell deserves more than the few words I can give it here, but
it is not difficult to show the amoral structure of the majority opinion
even without extended analysis. The heart of the opinion is at the end of
the due process discussion where Justice Kennedy states that the case
does not involve a new right but only the application of the previously
established fundamental right to marry, based on history and tradition.
Perhaps sensing how hollow that might sound, given the revolutionary
change the case announces, Justice Kennedy adds that rights come not
only from “ancient sources,” but also from a “better informed
understanding”—more modern?—of how constitutional imperatives
define liberty. None of this is grounded in anything beyond human
consensus, hinted at in the opinion by the invocation of the phrase
“cultural and political developments” to indicate growing societal
acceptance of gay people. Justice Kennedy is obviously very
sympathetic to the rights of gay persons. But he avoids any suggestion of
natural rights or any normative commitments beyond human
foundations.
The problem for Justice Kennedy was that there obviously is not a
full consensus in America about gay rights in general or gay marriage in
particular. Many Americans still hold that gay marriage is unnatural and
gay relationships immoral.
The only way, really, to respond when there is such a disagreement
is to admit it and to forthrightly assert that the counterview is morally
wrong. That is how, famously, Charles Black responded to the criticism
by Herbert Wechsler that Brown was not neutral but represented a value
choice by the Court 121—today we might say that Brown was not
supported by originalist principles but rested on a value judgment. Black
denied that the freedom of association of some whites, on the one hand,
and equality in the context of discrimination, on the other, were of equal
weight. 122 But that was not Justice Kennedy’s response.
121. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
122. Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 429
(1960). Cass Sunstein is right that Black asserted to some degree an interpretation of equal
protection as historical that originalism does not support. But Sunstein is projecting his own
nihilism when he accuses Black of “a form of self-delusion, a claim of necessity that masks
normative judgment of Black’s own.” Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown, 90 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1661 (2004). I’m confident that Black understood that he was expressing a normative commitment.
Unlike Sunstein, however, Black would not have understood that commitment as his “own.” Black
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What Justice Kennedy did instead was what Justice Blackmun did
in Roe—having established a right in precedent, thus avoiding any
discussion of the genesis of the right, he put the burden of proof to limit
it on opponents of the extension of the right. While Justice Kennedy was
very careful not to describe opposition to gay marriage as irrational, he
did characterize the views that gay marriage violates the inherent nature
of marriage and/or is morally wrong as merely subjective—opponents
base their conclusions on “religious or philosophical premises”; 123
“neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here”; 124 they have
“sincere, personal opposition.” But, in contrast, when such opinion
“becomes enacted law,” the consequence is to “demean[] or
stigmatize[]” same sex couples.
It seems to me that this contrast of personal views and enacted law
is meant to suggest that the mere opinions of opponents of gay marriage
cannot counter the fundamental right to marriage already established.
Opponents cannot point to any objective sense in which same sex
couples are different from many heterosexual couples who, biologically,
cannot have children. But, if the view that marriage is naturally between
two persons of opposite gender and that gay relationships are immoral is
subjective, then why is not the opposite view also subjective? So, in the
end, must not the majority conclusion rest on the commitment that the
opponents are wrong? Then, it would follow that their beliefs are
disparaged, in the sense that they are substantively rejected.
Justice Kennedy does not write this because of the death of values.
In other words, if he had just written that same sex marriage is not
immoral and that the opponents are wrong—as the entire Court in
Brown, Bolling, 125 and Loving, 126 would have been happy to do—he
would have had to face the old Leff “Sez who?”127 from Chief Justice
Roberts in dissent—”Five lawyers have closed the debate and enacted
their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law.” Justice
Kennedy had no answer to that.
The answer to that challenge should have been, five lawyers now,
but the truth of the matter will soon be apparent. After all, how is
Obergefell any different from the judicial decision that women are

would have regarded that commitment as true.
123. Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2602. This is the same treatment that Justice Scalia gave
philosophy above.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
126. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
127. See Leff, supra note 46.
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equal? That was not supported by history or tradition either. Justice
Kennedy should have written, yes, we five believe it, and we may be
wrong. But if we are wrong, history will correct us in the name of truth.
That is what Justice Harlan might once have written. 128 But Justice
Kennedy could not. And you and I cannot either. Not without selfconsciousness—not without the feeling that there is no foundation under
our feet. We all now live subject to the death of values.
In addition to the general shape of constitutional interpretation, the
death of values strongly influences one particular area—the role of
religion and religious exemptions from the requirements of general laws.
I will briefly set forth that influence in the next Part.
V. THE REFLECTION OF THE DEATH OF VALUES IN THE STRUGGLE OVER
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
American law is currently engaged in a controversy over the scope
of religious exemptions pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) and similar statutory and state constitutional provisions.129
The Supreme Court decision exempting for-profit corporations from
compliance with the Affordable Care Act contraception mandate in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Stores Inc. 130 and the subsequent injunction in
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 131 exempting a religious college from
complying with the very accommodation that the parties in Hobby Lobby
seemed to have won, point to a very broad judicial interpretation of the
RFRA and a continuing divisive debate over the proper place of
religious exemptions in American law.
While the arguments involved in this debate are beyond my scope
here, I hope to show that the overall shape of the debate over
exemptions, on both sides, is formed by the view that religious beliefs
are subjective and personal. The debate over religious exemptions is in
that sense a reflection of the death of values.
The exemptions debate takes place against the background of
Employment Division v. Smith, which held in 1990 132 that the Free
Exercise Clause gives a religious practitioner no protection against
128. Justice Harlan wrote of what we now call substantive due process, “That tradition is a
living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive . . . .”
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
129. See generally, Bruce Ledewitz, Experimenting With Religious Liberty: The QuasiConstitutional Status of Religious Exemptions, 6 ELON L. REV. 37 (2014).
130. 134 S. Ct. 2751(2014).
131. 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
132. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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generally applicable laws that are formally neutral about religion. Thus,
in the context of the Smith case, a law criminalizing the use of peyote is
constitutional even when applied to sincere practitioners of a wellestablished Native American religion that utilizes peyote in its core
ceremonies, without any particular showing by the government why a
religious exemption from the law could not be granted. 133
Smith was a thunderbolt. Although religious practitioners prior to
Smith almost always lost their challenges against generally applicable
laws—from a University arguing that race discrimination was religiously
required 134 to a religious group requesting exemption from the payment
of social security taxes 135—the government usually had to give some
kind of special reason—called a compelling interest—for burdening a
religious practice. That meant, at least as a practical matter, that the
concerns of religious practitioners would have to be considered when
government actions affected them. So, religious practitioners had some
leverage. After Smith, that leverage was gone.
The grounds of the Smith decision seemed surprising, given that
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion. In response to the claim that the
government was directly denying the right of the plaintiffs to the free
exercise of religion by forbidding the use of peyote—a clearly textual
argument—the textualist Scalia responded only “we do not think the
words must be given that meaning.” 136 Then the opinion added that prior
case law had never granted protection to religious practitioners from
neutral, generally applicable laws like the one at issue in Smith. The
opinion did not reject the plaintiffs’ textual interpretation as implausible,
nor did Justice Scalia bother to try to show that the commonly
understood meaning of the “free exercise” of religion at the time of the
adoption of the First Amendment would not have included the plaintiffs’
claims.
Since the Smith opinion did not rely on text or history—the
mainstays of conservative constitutional jurisprudence—on what did it
rely? Surprisingly, the Smith opinion relied on the kind of policy
argument that Justice Scalia usually rejects. According to Justice Scalia,
any society that requires the government to produce a compelling
interest every time a religious practitioner challenges a generally
133. Although there were no criminal prosecutions in Smith—it was actually a case about the
denial of unemployment compensation to drug counselors fired for using peyote in their religious
practice—the opinion was written as if it had been a challenge to the criminal statute.
134. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
135. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
136. 494 U.S. at 878.
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applicable law on the basis of the plaintiff’s own perception of the
centrality and importance of the religious practice at issue “would be
courting anarchy,” and this is especially true in a society of diverse
religious beliefs, all of which are constitutionally protected. 137
But why could not all these hypothetical religious claims be
winnowed by the judiciary? The plaintiffs in Smith were obviously
sincere; no one could doubt the centrality and importance of their claim
to their well-established religious practice; and, since a number of states
grant a specific exemption for the religious use of peyote, why not force
the government to explain why no religious exemption could be granted?
Future cases with less significant religious claims could be dismissed.
Justice Scalia explicitly warned that future cases with apparently
lesser claims could not be dismissed. The importance and centrality of a
religious practice could not be decided by a judge—”What principle of
law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion
that a particular act is ‘central’ to his personal faith?” 138 And, although
Justice Scalia did not have to rule on this issue, it would seem to follow
that a judge could not decide whether a particular claim presented as
“religious” really was religious. The reason for all of this inability is, as
Justice Scalia wrote, that “faith” is “personal.”
Justice Scalia was not worried that judges would judge these
wrongly. The clear suggestion in Smith is that there is no norm by which
such a judgment could be made at all. Religious faith is subjective—
always and only a matter of opinion—just as we saw above that value
judgments in general are subjective. Therefore, it would also be
subjective for a judge to weigh the importance of a religious practice.
As if to make all this clear, at the end of the Smith opinion, Justice
Scalia again warned against “a system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.” 139 Such a system would be
nothing but subjective opinion upon subjective opinion.
To his credit, Justice Scalia did not want to leave religious
practitioners without legal recourse. He reminded the authorities in
Oregon that they were free to enact a statutory exemption for
sacramental peyote use, as other states had done. Congress did precisely
137. Id. at 888. There is something comical about the holding in Smith, given Justice Scalia’s
opinion recognizing a personal constitutional right to own a working gun in District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In other words, according to Justice Scalia, a society courts anarchy if
it allows religious practitioners to go to court, but not if it allows almost every citizen to be armed.
138. Id. at 887.
139. Id. at 890.
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that, legalizing sacramental peyote use in 1994.140 But, the general
reaction to Smith brought a great deal more than a specific religious
exemption for peyote.
Smith was so unpopular that it eventually triggered an almost
unanimous response in Congress attempting to overturn the decision—
the RFRA. 141 Originally, the RFRA restored the compelling interest test
for courts to apply in any case in which the practice of religion is
substantially burdened by federal, state, or local governments, even if
that burden is occasioned by a law of general applicability. The Justices
later held that Congress lacked authority to impose this burden on the
states and localities. 142 But that left the RFRA in place for challenges to
federal laws. That is why the current religious challenges to the
contraceptive mandate in the federal Affordable Care Act proceeded
mainly under the RFRA. Meanwhile, many states have adopted their
own versions of the RFRA or have reacted to Smith by increasing the
protection of religious practice in other ways. 143
The RFRA did not change the subjective understanding of religious
exemption claims. While the Hobby Lobby case concerned a subsidiary
issue—the extent to which for-profit businesses and their owners could
claim the protections of the RFRA—the Wheaton College case and
affiliated litigation over the government’s accommodations for religious
entities continue to raise the question of the extent to which the claims of
religious practitioners can be challenged. Thus far, the Court has
suggested, as Justice Scalia predicted in Smith, that plaintiffs claiming
religious exemptions, if sincere, must be the sole judges of their
religious needs. 144 All that courts can do, aside from judging sincerity, is
to apply the compelling state interest test.
Naturally, critics of religious exemptions—and of religion itself—

140. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendment of 1994, 42 U.S.C.A. §1996(a)
(Westlaw through P.L. 114-49).
141. See Ledewitz, supra note 129, at 50.
142. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
143. See Ledewitz, supra note 129.
144. In Hobby Lobby, Justice Kennedy addressed the government’s argument that no religious
exemption was needed to the contraception mandate because “the connection between what the
objecting parties must do (provide health-insurance coverage for four methods of contraception that
may operate after the fertilization of an egg) and the end that they find to be morally wrong
(destruction of an embryo) is simply too attenuated . . . providing the coverage would not itself
result in the destruction of an embryo; that would occur only if an employee chose to take advantage
of the coverage and to use one of the four methods at issue.” 134 S. Ct. at 2777. Justice Kennedy
made it very clear, with italics, that the RFRA protects the right of “objecting parties to conduct
business in accordance with their religious beliefs.” Id. at 2778. Not in accordance with religious
practices the courts find to be reasonable.
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concede that religious claims are wholly subjective. For someone like
Brian Leiter, in his book, Why Tolerate Religion?, 145 that subjectivity is
one reason to eliminate religious exemptions. If religious exemptions are
eliminated, society suffers no loss of knowledge, since religion has
nothing to do with truth. 146
But, undoubtedly for strategic reasons, defenders of religious
exemption—and of religion itself—also argue that religious claims are
wholly subjective. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, a well-known and highly
respected student of religion, was scathing in her criticism of Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent in the Wheaton College case, accusing her of
challenging the rationality of religious beliefs:
Justice Sotomayor is sputtering mad about the Wheaton College injunction. She says that, while she does not deny the sincerity of its religious belief, the College failed to make a showing that filing a form
requesting an exemption is a substantial enough burden to trigger a
RFRA claim. Shifting to an argument about substantiality is an effort
to avoid challenging the rationality of their religious belief, but that is
exactly what she is doing. They say that filing the form is enough to
make them complicit with evil. Who is she to say nay without getting
into exactly the theological battle she is trying to avoid when she
147
claims to respect them?

It is easy to see that the treatment of religious exemptions as
completely subjective is not sustainable as a practical matter. In the
absence of objectivity of any kind—in the absence of coherence of any
kind—religious exemptions must eventually become conscience
exemptions and the protections for all such claims must be watered
down so that government does not become impossible.
This Article is not the context to consider how all this might be
changed or whether it can be or should be. The point here is that the
controversy over religious exemptions has its roots in the presumed
inability, and certainly the unwillingness, of the Justices to make
judgments about religious claims. And the controversy today continues
to manifest this purely subjective quality. The struggle over religious
exemptions is another example of the consequences of the death of
values.

145.
146.
147.

BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013).
Id. at 63.
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, THE IMMANENT
FRAME (Jul. 8, 2014), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2014/07/08/impossibility-of-religious-freedom/.
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VI. COPING WITH THE DEATH OF VALUES
How does law go on in the face of the death of values? The prior
sections suggest that there are two basic ways to cope, one conservative
and one liberal—restrictive methods of constitutional interpretation, on
the one hand, and the autonomy of individual choice on the other. I will
take up both of those strategies here. But, first, I will take up the denial
of the depth of the death of values as a coping mechanism.
In this section, these three coping mechanisms are basically set
forth. An analysis of their implications follows in Section VII. Even a
mere listing of these coping mechanisms, however, must briefly indicate
the basic flaws in the three positions. In different ways, each of these
three strategies is deformed by its failure to confront the death of values
in full and endure the dead end to which the death of values has brought
American law. Coping itself is not an adequate response to our situation.
A. The Death of Values is Only Apparent
In his influential book, Laws Quandary, 148 Steven Smith treats
statements like the one in Casey about the wrongness of Plessy as
evidence of what he calls an ontological gap—the gap between what
lawyers think we believe to be real, on the one hand, and, on the other,
the commitments we make and keep that appear to assume that other
kinds of matters are real. Specifically, Smith writes that legal elites
believe, or imagine they believe, that only material things are real—
particles and forces from a certain view of science—but speak and act as
if something like justice could be real, as in the injustice of Plessy the
day it was decided. References to what the law “is” or what “the
Constitution” contains no longer make sense given the ontological
commitments of at least our legal elites.
Smith proposes that this ontological gap comes from a failure to
take metaphysics seriously. He tries to do that by paying attention to our
presuppositions—what we mean when we speak of “the law of Equal
Protection” or cases wrongly decided. Understanding our language
would help lawyers own up to the ontological gap.
At the end of Law’s Quandary, Smith asks what we can do about
our ontological gap. But since he does not propose that lawyers stop
referring to “the law,” he really means what can we do about our meager
ontological commitments? In my terms, the question becomes, what can
we do about the death of values?
148.

STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004).
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Smith has two suggestions. One way out is the way of faith,
symbolized for Smith by the work of the legal philosopher Joseph
Vining. The other way is a kind of humble confession of our
circumstances and an openness to richer realities than we have yet
known. But none of this is specified by Smith. It is merely sketched.
How serious is the ontological gap for Smith? Smith says that our
moral commitments are nonsense given our ontology. But he also writes
that we can go on this way for a long time. Perhaps that is why Smith
does not concern himself too much with what should be done.
Or, it may be that Smith does not believe there really is an
ontological gap. Smith is so enamored of the habits of lawyerly life—
references to cases and holdings and so forth—that he attributes to them
a kind of alternative ontology in which law is real and discovered rather
than imposed by judicial and legislative fiat and through which the
unified intention of a single author—classically, God—is revealed in the
coherence of law as a whole. This alternative ontology then contradicts
the naturalism, positivism, and materialism of modern and postmodern
legal thinking that excludes in principle such inspired unity. Since one
cannot really hold both of these positions, Smith acknowledges that
some form of bad faith is operative among lawyers. But he suggests that
most lawyers actually accept the ontology of classical law and more or
less mouth the skepticism of postmodernity insincerely.
Unfortunately, for Smith and for us, the prior material as a whole
strongly suggests that he has it backward. Lawyers and judges really are
subject to the death of values and the skepticism that grounds it. Perhaps
lawyers and judges would like to believe differently, and even may
privately believe differently, but in the formation of law, the death of
values is supreme.
As to why these lawyerly habits persist, I will suggest in Part VIII
below the roles that these habits play in law school training.
B. Consensus, Tradition, and Originalism
These are the moves through which the political right in law copes
with the death of values. They enable conservatives to identify
constitutional rights, or to fend such claims off, without having to decide
any substantive normative issues.
Consensus entered into its modern role through interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
In a series of decisions since 2002, mentioned above, a 5-4 majority of
the Court has found a national consensus against various applications of
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punishments, such as imposition of the death penalty against persons
with mental retardation or the use of a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole against a juvenile in a non-homicide case. 149 A fourJustice dissenting bloc has agreed that the existence of a national
consensus is a proper ground from which to interpret the Eighth
Amendment but has denied that such a consensus exists in each
instance. 150
Consensus is pretty obviously irrelevant to Eighth Amendment
interpretation despite what the Justices say in these cases. Surely those
punishment practices the Eighth Amendment is deemed to have barred
from its beginning—such as the corporal punishments of the colonial
era—cannot be revived by a new national consensus to bring them back.
Nor should a punishment regarded as cruel be protected from
constitutional prohibition simply because a national majority supports it.
The simple problem with consensus is that it has nothing to do with
interpreting cruelty. If the Constitution gives the task of interpretation to
the courts, and if cruel punishments are to be banned, then the Justices
should be trying to decide what it is that makes a punishment cruel. That
task is not diminished by referring to it as philosophy or moral theory. It
is the task the Constitution sets. What is cruelty? Not what I believe is
cruel or can prove to be cruel beyond possible objection. Just, what is
cruelty? The reason this task is not undertaken is the fear, really the
certainty, that any answer given will be subject to the subjectivity of
value judgments.
The second move of conservative jurisprudence, the
constitutionalization of tradition, is an unjustified extension of judicial
authority, which was the immediate criticism by Justice White when the
matter was first raised in a modern constitutional context in Moore v.
East Cleveland: “What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is
arguable; which of them deserve the protection of the Due Process
Clause is even more debatable.” 151
The danger of judicial overreach in promoting an unbounded
constitutional protection for tradition was noted by conservative thinkers
at the time. 152 And Justice Scalia has attempted to cabin the doctrine of
tradition by reference to a proper level of generality in his famous

149. See notes 103-10, supra.
150. Id.
151. 431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
152. See e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic
Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss1/4

42

Ledewitz: When Values Died in American Law
04 LEDEWITZ MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

WHEN VALUES DIED IN AMERICAN LAW

11/16/2015 1:22 PM

157

footnote 6 in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 153
But the need to limit tradition just raises the question: why should
tradition be constitutionally protected in the first place? After all, any
tradition that a national majority wants to incorporate into the
Constitution can be incorporated by constitutional amendment. To grant
protection without amendment is reminiscent of Professor Bruce
Ackerman’s suggestion that the Depression and the response to it in the
New Deal should be regarded as a de facto amendment of the
Constitution, 154 a suggestion that conservative constitutional thought has
generally rejected. 155
One important reason that tradition occupies a constitutional role is
that it allowed Justice Scalia to parry the challenge by the lead opinion
in Casey that, without a constitutional protection of abortion, the
government could forbid a couple from having more than one child. 156
The obvious answer to this, given Justice Scalia’s general commitments,
should have been that the Constitution does not cure all ills. But Justice
Scalia could not bring himself to concede that the right of childbirth is
subject to government control. So, in footnote 1 in his dissent, he
claimed that abortion is not protected by tradition, but childbirth is.
Except for the domination of the death of values, he could have said
straightforwardly that abortion is morally wrong, while childbirth is
not—which I presume Justice Scalia inwardly believes.
The third move of conservative constitutionalism, originalism, is its
major contribution to constitutional interpretation and need not represent
a rejection of the rational unfolding of a value judgment. The public
meaning of a text and the practices against which it was aimed, could
enable the formulation of a principle of what a text means. That
principle could then be applied in a value-laden way.
But the rejection of value judgments will not apparently allow even
that much rationality into constitutional interpretation. Thus, in Town of
Greece v. Galloway, 157 and in dissents in Lee, and later in McCreary

153. 491 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6 (1989) (plurality opinion).
154. 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1992) (New Deal was the
third constitutional moment in American history constituting constitutional change); 2 BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000) (acts of popular sovereignty can amend
Constitution). The argument is continued in 3 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
155. See e.g., Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 2576
(2014).
156. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980, n.1 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
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County v. ACLU, 158 it is strongly suggested that the existence of a
practice at the time of the adoption of a constitutional text—legislative
prayer, graduation prayer, and public references to God—immunizes
that practice from constitutional challenge—an approach that would
have insulated both racial segregation and anti-miscegenation statutes
from constitutional challenge. 159
The objection that originalism represents moral relativism in
tension with the commitments of the founding generation has been ably
and consistently set forth by the noted conservative thinker, Harry V.
Jaffa. 160 Despite often agreeing with the results that conservative jurists
reached, Jaffa declared that the foundations of originalism lay in “legal
positivism, grounded in moral relativism and philosophical
nihilism . . . .” 161
Professor Jaffa particularly points to a statement written by thenJustice Rehnquist in 1976 with regard to inherent rights under the
American Constitution:
If such a society adopts a constitution and incorporates in that constitution safeguards for individual liberty, these safeguards indeed do take
on a generalized moral rightness or goodness. They assume a general
social acceptance neither because of any intrinsic worth nor because of
any unique origins in someone’s idea of natural justice but instead
simply because they have been incorporated in a constitution by the
162
people.

Jaffa regards this statement as a heresy against our constitutional
tradition. He writes: “Now I venture to say that 99.9% of the American
people—outside the academy—do not believe this, nor should they. If
the day comes when they do believe it, constitutional liberty will
crumble into dust.” 163
158. McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 US 844, 893 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely
clear from our Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of
polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”).
159. Granted, Justice Scalia specifically denies that history immunizes unconstitutional
practices, id. at 892, but what else but the pure fact of original practice allows the exclusion of
polytheists from the principle of religious nondiscrimination Justice Scalia otherwise admits is the
meaning of the Establishment Clause? Id. at 893.
160. See HARRY V. JAFFA, ET. AL., ORIGINAL INTENT & THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1994).
161. Harry V. Jaffa, Graglia Quarrels With God: Atheism and Nihilism Masquerading as
Constitutional Argument, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 715, 716 (1996).
162. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of A Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 704
(1976).
163. Jaffa, supra note 160, at 735-36.
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But I venture to say that the day has come. What is Eric Posner’s
attack on human rights in his new book, The Twilight of Human Rights
Law, 164 but an updated version of Rehnquist’s legal positivism, now
transferred to a critique of the notion of human rights at the international
level? Human rights are inherent for all or they are not inherent.
Recently, Steven Smith has attempted to defend a version of
originalism that he terms “decisional originalism,” which he believes to
be both more rational and more deferring to proper constitutional
authority than the “principle originalism” I was describing above. 165 This
Article is not the place to discuss his proposal—although I have to point
out that following ancient expectations detaches judicial decisionmaking from current meaning in such a way that it undermines any
legitimacy that judicial review has.166 But one can see the death of
values in the option of judicial review that Smith suspects nonoriginalists are actually practicing, but can never admit—”[J]udges
address the issues on the merits and give what seems to them the fairest
of most sensible answers.” 167 This is more or less the method of
substantive due process interpretation that Justice John M. Harlan
favored and if we believed that value judgments could correspond to
something real, as Justice Harlan did, judges could engage in that
approach expressly. 168
In any event, as shown above, no form of originalism is utilized by
conservative constitutional jurisprudence when constitutional norms do
not seem to require value judgments, as in free speech and procedural
due process. It is in this sense that originalism allows an escape from the
need for value judgments and thus copes with the death of values.
C. Individual, Sovereign Choice
Although quite different in apparent method, Jaffa correctly
concludes that what passes for liberal constitutional method, is rooted in
“that very same legal positivism” that animates conservative
constitutional interpretation. 169 The difference is that conservative
164. ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014).
165. Steven D. Smith, Meanings or Decisions? Getting Originalism Back on Track, LIBRARY
OF LAW AND LIBERTY (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/meanings-ordecisions-getting-originalism-back-on-track/.
166. Smith’s approach would have ruled out Loving and Equal Protection’s heightened
scrutiny for gender discrimination, for example.
167. Smith, supra note 165.
168. For a fuller indication of Justice Harlan’s approach, see Bruce Ledewitz, Justice Harlan’s
Law and Democracy, 20 J.L. & POL. 373 (2004).
169. Jaffa, supra note 160, at 716.
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thought tends to aim at judicial deference to forms of group social life,
past and present, while liberal thought aims at judicial deference to the
sovereign individual.
In its first appearance, this hyper-individualistic approach was the
move of the political left to defend unpopular fundamental rights without
having to assert the objectivity of values that, it was felt, could not be
defended directly. But the move is now migrating into the realm of
religious practice under the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA.
As explained above, the lead opinion in Casey defended the right to
choose abortion precisely at the point, and in the service of, individual
choice. Both in Casey and before, in Roe, this strategy of argument took
advantage of the death of values by positing the right of privacy and then
asserting that the government could not prove that its value judgment
prohibiting the practice at issue was objectively justified.
The downside of this approach was not immediately apparent in the
abortion context. For in that context, the government’s underlying
value—life—was conceded to be objective. The issue was only at what
point life begins.
But when this same strategy of individual self-determination was
employed in gay rights cases, the result was much more radical. For, in
those cases, the government’s justification for banning, first gay sexual
expression, and then gay marriage, was that the government viewed the
practices in question as immoral. Justice Stevens’ view in dissent in
Bowers, which was adopted by the majority in Lawrence, condemned
the government’s right to this moral judgment: “[T]he fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice.” 170
This was a revolutionary approach to the legitimate state interest
test, for it fully separated law from morality. And this separation has
since been adopted in other cases. 171
Although Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Lawrence, criticized the
divergence of law from morality—this “proposition is . . . out of
accord . . . with the jurisprudence of any society we know” 172—he
should not have done so. The separation between law and morality
follows inevitably from the view he expressed nine years earlier in
dissent in Casey that value judgments are nothing more than matters of

170.
171.
172.

Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
In gay marriage cases, for example. See infra note 175.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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opinion. If gay people have the liberty to engage in sexual relations, as
Justice Scalia conceded in Lawrence, 173 how could the merely contrary
opinion of society be considered a legitimate basis upon which to forbid
the conduct? 174 To put this plainly, if values cannot be rational, but can
only be a construct, then values can never be a legitimate basis on which
to found a coercive legal judgment. Only if society’s claim against gays
were a claim of truth, could the repression in Lawrence be justified. But
then the Justices would have to forthrightly face and evaluate this claim
of truth. 175
The other side of this coin of individual choice is the growing
notion that religious practices are entirely non-rational. 176 As described
above, no matter how extreme and arbitrary a religious claim seems to
be, there can be no second guessing by judges except to test the sincerity
of the religious believer. In this way, unreviewable, individual choice,
which was originally a claim from the political left, has now migrated to
be a claim by the political right. Such is the power of the death of values.
VII. THE DARK SIDE OF COPING WITH THE DEATH OF VALUES
The coping mechanisms described above lead law to monstrous
moral arguments, the eventual collapse of morality, the illegitimacy of
constitutional government and the loss of democracy. These coping
mechanisms are a major reason why law schools emptied out in the
recent economic downturn.
But, of course, it is not really the coping mechanisms that are the
issue. They are merely the symptoms of law’s failure to confront the
death of values. I don’t mean a failure to “cure” the death of values—for
Heidegger never promised that nihilism would be overcome—I only
mean that the failure to seek knowledge of nihilism is killing law.

173. Id. at 586.
174. Granted, the actual formulation of the test is rationally related to a legitimate interest,
thus turning reason into mere instrumentality. But I assume Justice Scalia would wish to defend the
rationality of the government’s interest. Nevertheless, the death of values undermines that effort.
175. Cases striking down gay marriage bans have pursued two strategies to avoid evaluating
substantive moral claims by government. In some cases, as in Lawrence, the courts deny that moral
claims can justify government action. See e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 552 (W.D.
Ky. 2014). In others, the courts hold, as in Roe, that given the fundamental right to marry, the
government’s moral claim cannot be proven with sufficient certainty to overcome heightened
scrutiny. See e.g., Whitehood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 423-24, 430-31 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
176. See discussion, supra Part V.
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A. The Justification of Immorality
In his dissent in Casey, Justice Scalia felt the need to contest the
assertion by the lead opinion that the Justices were engaging in
“‘reasoned judgment’” in their interpretation of the Constitution. 177 But,
consistently with the death of values, Justice Scalia contested this
assertion not by showing that the right to choose abortion is unreasoned,
but by asserting that no such judgment could be reasoned:
The whole argument of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls
the fetus and what others call the unborn child is a human life. Thus,
whatever answer Roe came up with was bound to be wrong, unless it is
correct that the human fetus is in some critical sense merely potentially
human. There is, of course no way to determine that as a legal matter;
it is in fact a value judgment. Some societies have considered the newborn children not yet human, or the incompetent elderly no longer so.
The emptiness of the “reasoned judgment” that produced Roe is displayed in plain view by the fact that, after more than 19 years of effort
by some of the brightest (and most determined) legal minds in the
country, after more than 10 cases, the best the Court can do to explain
how the word ‘liberty’ must be thought to include the right to destroy
human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply dec178
orate a value judgment and conceal a political choice.

But why can’t the humanity of the fetus be determined as a legal
matter? Law in the Due Process Clause instructs the courts to protect
“life.” Why can’t law borrow from other disciplines to decide that
matter, as it sometimes does, for example, to decide whether a stream is
navigable? 179 Don’t the advances in fetal imaging suggest that at least at
some point the fetus is fully human? Why, in other words, can’t Justice
Scalia argue that the lead opinion is wrong in its reasoned judgment,
rather than asserting that reason can have nothing to do with it?
All Justice Scalia can say is that the humanity of the fetus is a value
judgment and therefore a matter of opinion. And then he even expands
this line of argument to include the decision to kill a newborn baby and
an incompetent older person.
Let Justice Scalia’s monstrous argument reverberate for a moment:
177. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
178. Id. at 983-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting.)
179. Compare the references by Justices Scalia and Kennedy to Leibowitz & Nadeau, Isolated
Wetlands: State–of–the–Science and Future Directions, 23 WETLANDS 663 (2003) in Rapanos v.
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 756, n. 15, 782 (2006). Of course the references might be mere
window dressing on formal and ideological reasoning.
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If society decided to allow newborn children to be killed, the courts
could do nothing about it. It would be a value judgment. Justice Scalia
must say this for he has already refused, in advance, to consider whether
the fetus is human—”The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on
demand . . . .” 180
No common law judge would have treated values this way. Bob
Cover, in his book Justice Accused, reminds us that some judges, even
without justification in positive law, engaged in legal interpretation
during the slavery period “in favorem libertatis.” 181 They would never
have suggested that the value of freedom was just a matter of opinion.
How then can life be?
This is what happens when judges accept the death of values as
something natural and inevitable. They end up afraid to challenge the
indefensible.
B. The Collapse of All Morality
It takes the Stevens/Kennedy position in Bowers/Lawrence to make
the point express—so express that Justice Scalia is startled at the
implications of the death of values he had himself assented to—that
since all moral claims are matters of opinion, government may never act
to defend morality and may never invoke morality to defend its actions.
This position has not garnered the scorn it deserves for it is viewed
as the only basis on which to defend gay rights from government
prohibition. I will return to that issue in a moment. But, what about all of
the rest of government regulation? Don’t progressives realize that the
entire edifice of the social welfare state rests upon the moral judgment
that the rich have enough, given the inequalities of income in society,
and so must be forced to share their wealth with others?
What kind of claim is this other than a moral one? The wealth of
the rich does not itself harm the poor. Their acquisition of wealth has not
violated society’s rules. Nor is redistribution fully justified to avoid
immediate harm, such as starvation or homelessness. No, it is just right
that the rich be made to share.
The justification of income redistribution is a much disputed matter.
I don’t mean here to establish anything with regard to it, except that the
pure statement that moral judgments cannot justify government coercion
would undermine income redistribution.
180.
181.
(1975).
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But unless morality is constructed, mustn’t the courts defer to
majority prohibitions against gay rights? Not necessarily. It is only the
death of values that suggests that there is safety in the collapse of
morality. Gay rights could be defended as morally right and laws
discriminating against gay people could be condemned as morally
wrong.
A bold Court in Lawrence could have said that the moral claim by
the government in that case was irrational without suggesting that all
moral claims are irrational. That would have been difficult in the current
atmosphere. But the reason we believe such a position hard to defend is
the very death of values that is undermining morality and undermining
law.
C. The Illegitimacy of Constitutional Government
Up to this point, I have been emphasizing the interpretation of the
Constitution and the content of law under the death of values. But there
is another, deeper aspect of our situation. One of the necessities of any
form of government is its account of why it is legitimate. Because of the
death of values, it is no longer clear that constitutional government is in
fact legitimate.
On January 3, 2014, at the annual convention of the American
Association of Law Schools, the Section on Constitutional Law
sponsored an unusual discussion. Normally, some topic currently before
the Supreme Court is discussed on such occasions. But, instead of that
kind of program, the Section addressed the topic, “The Importance of
Constitutionalism.” The description of the topic made it clear that the
issue raised was, in effect, the legitimacy of our constitutional
government from the perspective of political theory and what could be
called the perspective of “We the People of the United States.”
Four scholars were selected to make presentations. For my purpose
here, the key exchange was between Sanford Levinson, from the
University of Texas Law School, and Randy Barnett, from Georgetown.
Levinson led off the program with an attack on the undemocratic nature
of the Constitution. Levinson’s arguments were similar to those raised in
the classic book, How Democratic is the American Constitution?, by
Robert Dahl. 182
Then Barnett countered with an electrifying presentation. In effect,
he accused Levinson, and by extension, most of the law professors

182.

ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2d ed. 2003).
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present—for most of us certainly agreed with Levinson, including me—
of a lack of constitutional faith. From the perspective of the Constitution,
the legitimacy of democracy is not to be presumed. It would be closer to
the understanding of the Framers to assert that the legitimacy of
democracy itself, understood as rule by the majority, is the problem with
which the Constitution was intended to deal. The undemocratic elements
of the Constitution should be thought of as protections of the natural
rights of each individual citizen from illegitimate coercion by the
majority. The proper question, therefore, is how well the Constitution
accomplishes that task. Barnett’s presentation encapsulated his book,
Restoring the Lost Constitution. 183
Barnett was the perfect person to issue this challenge. He was the
instigating thinker behind the constitutional challenge that, but for Chief
Justice John Roberts’s surprising holding that penalties are taxes, would
have upended the Affordable Care Act. 184 Barnett has made it his
purpose to restore the understanding of the proper role of government in
America to that of the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That
to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .

As Barnett understands it, the nature of consent to the coercive
power of government for the Framers was not any actual or expressed
consent, nor presumed consent manufactured from not leaving a
jurisdiction. Rather, human beings hypothetically consent to government
as long as their unalienable—natural—rights are respected. While this
understanding of the Constitution does not justify each particular
undemocratic element in it, it does change the focus of debate away
from majoritarianism to the protection of rights.
Barnett’s vision is of course not original. It is a lost way of
understanding the relationship between the citizen and her government.
And it is a powerful justification for something like our form of
government. The other influential consent theory is that of John Rawls.
But Rawls’ “original position” from which hypothetical persons, who do
not know what their endowments and position in society would be,
choose political arrangements that are then considered just, suffers from
183. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (Princeton University Press rev. ed. 2014).
184. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

51

Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 4
04 LEDEWITZ MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

166

11/16/2015 1:22 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[49:115

its unreality. 185 Rawlsian thinking collapsed in recent years under,
among other things, the pressure from religious practitioners who
considered their religious commitments more fundamental than any
political commitments. 186 In any event, Rawls was not mentioned, as far
as I remember, in that January discussion.
The difficulty with Barnett’s position today, under the power of the
death of values, is that it presupposes that natural rights are real. This
foundation is clear in his book when Barnett quotes the sermon of Elizur
Goodrich delivered to the governor and legislature of Connecticut on the
eve of the Constitutional Convention:
The principles of society are the laws, which Almighty God has established in the moral world, and made necessary to be observed by mankind; in order to promote their true happiness, in their transactions and
intercourse. These laws may be considered as principles, in respect of
their fixedness in operation; and as maxims, since by the knowledge of
them, we discover those rules of conduct, which direct mankind to the
highest perfection, and supreme happiness of their nature. They are as
fixed and unchangeable as the laws which operate in the natural
187
world.

The problem the death of values poses for Barnett is that this real
foundation for unchanging rights is now in question. Barnett never
confronts this problem. Instead, he deals with it by substituting human
consensus as the foundation for our rights in place of the unchanging
moral architecture of the universe:
Whatever else people may believe they have a right to, most all people
believe that they have the right to make their own choices and act as
they please with what belongs to them; that they can do as they will
188
with what is theirs provided their actions do not harm others.

Barnett does not appear to see that without the foundation appealed
to by Goodrich, which Barnett evidently believes, along with Heidegger,
can no longer serve as the foundation of a civilization, his “rights”
amount to nothing more than a conservative political agenda in which
rich people would prefer not to be taxed or regulated. Worse, from
Barnett’s perspective, his invocation of consensus brings us right back to
185. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
186. See e.g., Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The Demands of Public Reason, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1936, 1943 (1994); David Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and
Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 893 (1993).
187. BARNETT, supra note 183,at 81 (emphasis provided).
188. Id. at 80.
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the majoritarianism that he originally rejects as the foundation for the
legitimacy of government. People apparently do not believe what
Barnett attributes to them, or they do not believe it in the same way that
he does, or they would not have voted for the Affordable Care Act, in
effect, twice. And it is their actual commitments, not Barnett’s verbal
formulas, that comprise our rights under a theory of consensus. This is
the dead end to which the death of values brings the project of
legitimizing constitutional government.
D. The Loss of Democracy
Before ending this Section, I want to present one more breakdown
brought about by the death of values—the inability of law to protect
democracy itself. This is surprising, since democracy would seem to be
the sort of process value I earlier suggested the Justices of the Supreme
Court could protect despite the death of values. It turns out, however,
that democracy is the sort of spiritual practice—in the sense of the
German word, Geist—that requires a faith we no longer have.
Because I am going to criticize three Republican Party legal
strategies—the voter ID laws, the political gerrymander and the
manipulation of the Electoral College—let me begin with a Democratic
Party strategy that illustrates the same nihilistic worldview. In the late
spring of 2014, Democratic Party operatives were widely reported to be
building elaborate “get-out-the-vote” targeting strategies in states with
close Senate election races. This strategy made perfect sense because
one big problem for the Democratic Party is that groups that lean their
way, such as young voters and racial minority groups, tend to sit out offyear elections. That reduction in turnout was one reason the Democrats
faced real problems in the fall, 2014 elections. 189
But turnout was not the only reason the Democrats were in trouble.
President Barack Obama’s popularity ratings were low because after six
years in office, he and his Party, in the view of many, had failed to
deliver prosperity and a safer world. Turnout manipulation is a way to
insulate the Party from that democratic fallout from failure. If
Democratic Party officials really cared about democracy, they would
have welcomed the disaster that was about to befall the Party as a
necessary democratic correction by the people. But, of course, no
partisan Democrat felt that way.
189. See generally, Michael Tomasky, How Bad for Obama and the Democrats, NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 8, 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/may/08/howbad-for-obama-and-democrats/?page=2.
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The turnout strategy did not work. The 2014 elections were bad for
the Democrats. But, in a closer year, the Democrats might have held off
the democratic reckoning. The Democrats certainly were willing to try to
do so.
What did Heidegger mean when he told Der Spiegel in that 1966
interview that he was not convinced that democracy could be assigned to
this age?
A decisive question for me today is how a political system can be assigned to today’s technological age at all, and which political system
would that be? I have no answer to this question. I am not convinced
190
that it is democracy.

I am not claiming to understand Heidegger, but his observation shines a
light on the turnout phenomenon. The experts, who believe that they can
and should substitute the techniques of voter turnout for the genuine
expression of the will of the people, are already convinced that there is
no such thing as the will of the people. There are, instead, just outcomes
with winners and losers. We want our side to win and in a technological
age, we develop techniques to try to accomplish that result.
I am not suggesting that turn-out-the-vote technologies are morally
wrong. They are beyond good and evil. Such techniques are an
inevitable result of a time that is too technologically adept to leave the
people to their own democratic devices.
Now that the reader can see that I am pointing to technological
forces rather than human evil, and that Democrats have the same
worldview as do Republicans, let me introduce three Republican Party
strategies that, if all were implemented fully, would destroy democracy
in the United States.
That sounds like a hysterical exaggeration. But it is not.
Let me begin with voter ID laws. These are laws that require
showing some form of government-issued voter photo ID before one can
vote. In principle, such laws are neutral and benign—similar to the
requirement to present a photo ID before flying. Such laws will only
disenfranchise a small number of voters. But, almost all the voters they
will disenfranchise vote Democratic. In a close election—and recently
many of our elections have been close—this could make the difference.
That is why Mike Turzai, a Republican leader in Pennsylvania chortled
that voter ID would allow Republican Party Presidential candidate Mitt
Romney to win Pennsylvania:

190.

Der Spiegel, supra note 47.
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House Majority Leader Mike Turzai (R-Allegheny) suggested that the
House’s end game in passing the Voter ID law was to benefit the GOP
politically.
“We are focused on making sure that we meet our obligations that
we’ve talked about for years,” said Turzai in a speech to [Republican
State Committee] members Saturday. He mentioned the law among a
laundry list of accomplishments made by the GOP-run legislature.
“Pro-Second Amendment? The Castle Doctrine, it’s done. First prolife legislation—abortion facility regulations—in 22 years, done. Voter
ID, which is gonna allow Governor Romney to win the state of Penn191
sylvania, done.”

Since no one believes there is any sizeable amount of voter fraud going
on that voter ID laws will end, this comment amounts to an admission of
the intent of vote suppression.
Then there is the political gerrymander, which Republicans have
been astonishingly successful in implementing. In the 2012 election, the
Republican use of the political gerrymander allowed that Party to control
the House of Representatives against all expressions of national
sentiment. In North Carolina, for example, Sam Wang reported in the
New York Times that:
[T]he two-party House vote was 51 percent Democratic, 49 percent
Republican, the average simulated delegation was seven Democrats
and six Republicans. The actual outcome? Four Democrats, nine Republicans — a split that occurred in less than 1 percent of simulations.
If districts were drawn fairly, this lopsided discrepancy would hardly
192
ever occur.

Similar lopsided splits occurred in other states, like Pennsylvania.
Finally, there is the threat of permanent minority Presidential
elections that could easily be accomplished through manipulation of the
Electoral College. Presidents in the United States are not elected directly
by the people. Instead, in each state, Presidential electors are actually
elected and each state awards its electoral votes in the manner its
legislature chooses.
This system is already undemocratic because of the way the number
191. Kelly Cemetich, Turzai: Voter ID Law Means Romney Can Win Pa, POLITICS PA, June
25, 2012, http://www.politicspa.com/turzai-voter-id-law-means-romney-can-win-pa/37153/. These
comments were widely reported in the media and were not denied by Turzai.
192. Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 2, 2013, available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of2012.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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of a state’s electoral votes is determined in the Constitution—the number
is equal to the total congressional delegation so that smaller states have
disproportionate weight because of their two Senators. Yet in general the
current system works tolerably well in the sense that the Presidential
candidate with the most votes nationally usually wins, and when that
does not happen, as it did not most recently in 2000, the direct vote is
usually extremely close. The American people have undoubtedly come
to rely on these facts.
The reason the Electoral College system usually works to elect the
candidate with the higher number of votes nationally is that, with the
exception of Maine and Nebraska, 193 electors are elected on a winnertake-all basis. That is, all electors pledged to the presidential candidate
who wins the most votes in a state become electors from that state. In
contrast, Maine and Nebraska use the congressional district method,
selecting one elector in each congressional district by popular vote and
selecting the remaining two electors by a statewide popular vote.
The winner take all method has the effect of discounting the votes
of the minority Party. So, it is predictable that the Democratic
Presidential candidate will win California and the Republican candidate
will win Texas before the campaign begins. But since this suppression
happens equally in Democratic and Republican leaning states, the
overall result nationally is usually reflective of the national vote.
But in the last few years, Republican Party leaders have discussed a
national strategy of converting Democratic leaning states in which
Republicans temporarily control the state government, such as occurred
in Pennsylvania, to the congressional district method. If this actually
occurred in only a few Democratic leaning states, but in no Republican
leaning ones, the result would be that the Republican candidate for
President would usually win, even if the national vote for President
were, for example, 51% to 49% in favor of the Democratic candidate.
The Presidential candidate with fewer votes might even win every
election. 194
This result would be a disaster for America—and I don’t mean
because Republicans would be elected. It would mean the end of popular

193. Nebraska has been considering dropping its District selection system in favor of winnertake-all. Doug Mataconis, Nebraska To Abandon District Method for Electoral Voting Allocation?,
OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/nebraska-to-abandondistrict-method-for-electoral-vote-allocation/.
194. See Eric Black, Latest Attempt to Manipulate the Electoral College Vote is not New,
Feb.4,
2013,
http://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2013/02/latest-attemptMINNPOSt,
manipulate-electoral-college-vote-isn-t-new.
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government and, perhaps eventually, the takeover of a now-discredited
political system by some form of dictatorship. Republicans who talk
about doing this simply don’t understand the magnitude of what they are
thinking of doing. Our political system is hanging on by a thread.195 But
the reason this manipulation can actually be discussed is the same reason
the Democrats are content to win by turnout technique—we no longer
believe in something like “the will of the people.” That is the fruit of the
death of values.
The point for law is that the Supreme Court today lacks the
confidence and vision to protect the people from these machinations.
Voter ID laws should have been struck down as an interference with the
right to vote. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court essentially did that in
2012, remanding a voter ID law for a trial under an unattainable “no
voter disenfranchisement” standard pursuant to the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 196 But, in contrast, the United States Supreme Court
myopically upheld an Indiana voter ID law under the federal
Constitution in 2008. 197 Similarly, the Supreme Court has never struck
down a political gerrymander and has so far failed to note in its opinions
on the subject just how effective a threat to democracy this form of
gerrymander has become. 198
In terms of the Electoral College, since the text of the Constitution
specifically allows the manipulation that some Republicans are pushing,
it would take an act of real judicial courage to require all states to retain
the winner take all format because, at this point, democratic legitimacy
requires it. It is unlikely that this nonpartisan will exists on the Supreme
Court.
I end this Part on this note purposely. The death of values has
brought about the death of law as a meaningful enterprise. Under the
reign of the death of values, there is nothing law can do.
Finally, and not surprisingly, these breakdowns in law are reflected
in the current downturn in law school applications. That is where this
examination of the death of values finishes.

195. Again, I mean this literally. It was widely rumored that the Republican controlled
legislature in Pennsylvania would have made the switch to a congressional system but for the fact
that an honorable man, Republican Governor Tom Corbett, opposed the change.
196. Applewhite v. Com., 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012). The standard was not satisfied, and the lower
court judge found the law to be a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution in January 2014.
197. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
198. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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VIII. THE DEATH OF LAW SCHOOL AND THE DEATH OF VALUES
The 2008 recession hit law school applications and enrollment very
hard. In the fall of 2014, there were 37,924 full- and part-time students
enrolled in their first year of law study, a decline of 30% from the
beginning of the 2010-2011 school year. 199
The reason for the decline is not mysterious. The recession affected
employment for lawyers. A year after graduation, the unemployment
rate for the law school class of 2011 was 12% versus a one-year
unemployment rate of 5.8% for the class of 2007. 200 Potential law school
students were wary of going into debt to go to law school when job
prospects were uncertain. Law schools have responded by lowering the
cost of law school, which in turn has affected the income and job
prospects of law school faculty.
But is unemployment the entire story of this decline? This is a
dramatic reduction in a very short time. Would engineering or arts
school enrollment respond in similar dramatic fashion to a downturn in
employment? Or physics study? Perhaps part of the story of law school
decline is that some of these potential students did not have a burning
desire to study law or to become lawyers—that, instead, it was just a
career option rather than a vocation.
I have been to several conferences in recent years that have
addressed supposed shortcomings in legal education as a way of
addressing this new, straitened context for law schools. Advances in
teaching and academic support have been proposed and adopted
nationally. The American Bar Association is requiring increases in
experiential learning, including an enhanced focus on clinical education.
An effort is being made to render law school graduates practice ready.
But I have not heard much, if anything, about what law school is
supposed to be about. Yes, there are skills to be acquired, but what are
those skills supposed to enable a legal practitioner to do? I believe part
of the reason for law school decline is that law professors today have
little idea of what the study of law is. And without a clear understanding
of that, the study of law cannot excite students.
Different answers to the question of what law study is about can be
imagined. But all are questionable in light of the death of values.
For example, law is always said to be about resolving disputes.
199. Elizabeth Olson & David Segal, A Steep Slide in Law School Enrollment Accelerates,
NEW YORK TIMES, Dec., 17, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/law-school-enrollmentfalls-to-lowest-level-since-1987/ (figures recently released by the ABA).
200. Id.
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Every society needs a formal mechanism to do that. That is obviously
one purpose of a legal system, particularly with regard to disputes
among individuals and businesses. (The American penchant for
judicially enforceable limits on government used to be fairly unique in
the world, but it has always been the case that societies used law for
resolving private disputes). Could law schools then teach dispute
resolution?
The answer is probably not, in part because dispute resolution is not
a brute fact. Some ways of resolving disputes are better than others, in
the sense of reducing future disputes and reducing future tension over
past disputes. Presumably, decisions that accord with a popular sense of
justice and fairness resolve disputes better. So, “might makes right”
would resolve the dispute in question but would not function well in the
long run.
The problem for American law, and the reason law school is not
about resolving disputes, is that the popular sense of justice is that a just
solution means really just and not “just as a matter of opinion.” A judge
is not free to say in deciding a case that “most people would find for the
plaintiff.” And it will also not be considered satisfactory for the judge to
say that “the plaintiff wins because he will make trouble for everyone if
he loses.”
Therefore, the only way for a legal system to resolve disputes is to
engage in a search for real justice. If American law finds it difficult to do
this because of the death of values, then even this ordinary role for law
will suffer.
This conclusion does not necessitate that the substance of justice
must come from a judge. A part of the conception of real justice could
include resolving who decides what. It could be that a legislative
decision has already been made that applies to some particular dispute.
But it is also the case that the American Constitution has been
interpreted consistently to place at least some decisions beyond the
authority of legislatures and executives. So, sometimes it will have to be
judges who decide.
But whoever ultimately decides, that decision must include an
element of enduring justice. We can therefore conclude that dispute
resolution cannot forthrightly provide a role for law school unless law
schools confront the death of values.
If not dispute resolution, are law students learning to discern the
law? But that would also require something of the ontology of values
that has died. Law would have to be something to be discovered.
There are, of course, lawyerly methods in which students in law
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schools are inculcated. All American law schools teach students to argue
in the interests of their clients based on supposed holdings of prior cases.
All law students gain a sense of law as a systematic whole of at least
somewhat interrelated parts. All law students learn to distinguish
authoritative aspects of judicial decisions from dicta and learn to
distinguish one case from another in its application to a current case. All
American lawyers know how to write briefs and make arguments to
judges based upon these techniques. These have been lawyerly skills
since the era of the common law. At that time, these skills were thought
of as the methods through which law was discovered.
But even though lawyers still argue the proper interpretation of
cases, I do not believe that law students are learning genuine common
law thinking. Lawyers today are also very comfortable with the notion of
“majority” and “minority” views of legal issues, with judges in different
states taking one position or the other based on disagreements over the
usual sorts of pragmatic considerations. And while a lawyer may view
cases applying strict liability in tort or finding liability in a holder in due
course, for example, as either wise or mistaken—and thus “correct” or
not in a sense—that sense is not the same as the older view that one
judicial approach really was the law and the other really was not the law.
When judges decide such cases today, in the increasingly rare
situations in which statutes do not control, they know that they are
making choices of some kind. And, like the Justices in 1992, they try to
avoid making value judgments when they can. Instead, they decide
according to human norms deemed to be predetermined—whether
maximizing utility or the gross national product or promoting procedural
fairness. These norms are said by such judges to be embedded in
positive legal sources. Such decisions are not exceptions to the death of
values but the best we think we can do under it.
Others may see common law judging differently. But even Steve
Wise, the American lawyer who is using the common law most
creatively today to establish legal rights for animals, admits that most
common law judges are applying human norms when they decide cases
rather than applying any enduring value. Wise distinguishes formal
judges, who follow either prior case law or the legal principles that the
cases may be said to represent, from substantive judges who apply
contemporary public values or the community’s sense of justice, and
distinguishes both of these from principle judges, who apply moral
principles to cases. This latter group is a minority of judges and even
among that minority, not all these judges are thinking in terms of
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enduring moral principles. 201
We are in a period in which law schools teach familiar and even
ancient techniques of legal analysis but no longer have a clear idea what
these techniques are supposed to do. We cannot credibly teach objective
values with universal application because of the death of values—values
that legal methods used to be thought to reach. But then why do law
schools still teach more or less the same way they did fifty years ago?
This was the kind of question that the precursors of legal realism used to
ask, who expected economics and statistics to eventually supplant
traditional legal analysis in law school education.
I am not sure of the answer to this question. But it may be that there
is no legitimate reason. It is possible that law schools teach these
traditional techniques, and lawyers utilize them, out of habit and selfinterest.
By habit I don’t just mean that lawyers are taught the way they are
because they have always been taught that way and therefore these
training practices carry authority and legitimacy by virtue of their
pedigree. There is some of that, as illustrated in the 1973 movie, The
Paper Chase. But that world is fading—most law students today have
never seen that movie and are not particularly romantic about these
practices. The so-called Socratic method, with its humiliations and
alleged insights, is not what it used to be.
No, by habit I mean the disreputable reliance on established
practices to avoid thinking about what judges and lawyers might actually
be able to contribute to the welfare of society. Law professors teach
what is called mid-level doctrinal analysis to first year law students
because we don’t know how to teach anything else. Aside from some
occasional experimentation with economics, and aside from the high
profile constitutional/political controversies, we law professors have no
idea how legal issues should be decided. It is to be assumed that judges,
who are also products of this law school system, actually decide cases
based not on anything they learned in law school, but based on intuitive
judgments of various kinds or commitments from outside law.
The habitual law school curriculum would not be of very much use
to a judge actually trying to decide a societal issue, which is why I
assume that good judges use the sort of pragmatic approach that Judge
Richard Posner talks about as the proper judicial role. 202 At the best and

201. See How Common Law Judges Decide Cases, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT,
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/how-common-law-judges-decide-cases/.
202. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008).
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most innovative law schools, students might pick up a few tools of the
social sciences, such as a little economics and statistics. But not enough
to be of help to a judge deciding a case. 203
Certainly, law school could become the place where talented
generalists learn all the tools we know for promoting flourishing social
life—lawyers would then be social physicians to society—but that is in
no sense what law school is like today. Today we still teach students to
read cases.
Habit thus in part represents a kind of intellectual sloth in the law
school curriculum. But there may be another reason that law schools
teach formal legal analysis to the practical exclusion of everything else.
This other reason would be less benign than intellectual laziness.
There is nothing very impressive about what lawyers actually do.
Without the mumbo jumbo of the legal formalism that Steven Smith
celebrates, clients in particular and society in general might figure out
that law and lawyers are an expensive and unnecessary addition to the
problem solving skills that ought usually to be applied to disputes
instead of applying law. It is thus in the interest of lawyers that law
schools teach not real analysis but a kind of Neverland analysis
consisting of teasing out case holdings and distinguishing precedent,
which only lawyers can do.
Worse than that, the actual outcomes of cases might be dependent
on ideology and political commitments that formal legal analysis has
nothing to do with. So, law students might study cases like Citizens
United v. FEC204 or Bush v. Gore 205 or Roe v. Wade, 206 but never come
to grips with why such cases were decided the way that they were. Chief
Justice Roberts might hold that the individual mandate in National
Association of Independent Business v. Sebelius 207 is a tax rather than a
penalty, but a class in constitutional law would have no context in which
to address that decision. It is perfectly obvious that the line of Eighth
Amendment cases adverted to above had nothing really to do with
national consensus, but was determined, rather, by the felt necessities of
five Justices. But how is this to be taught?
Under all these circumstances, law school feels arcane and
203. “Lawyers eventually learn that judges are more realistic than formalistic, but they have
not been equipped by their education to articulate and substantiate pragmatic arguments in a form
convincing to judges.” Jonathan Maur, How Judges Think: A Conversation with Richard Posner,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/spring08/posnerhowjudgesthink.
204. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
205. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
206. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
207. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss1/4

62

Ledewitz: When Values Died in American Law
04 LEDEWITZ MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

WHEN VALUES DIED IN AMERICAN LAW

11/16/2015 1:22 PM

177

disconnected from social life. A student might still enroll because law is
the only route to what seems like the levers of social power, but the
content of law school teaching would be beside the point. Law school
would not be the kind of attractor that science and art can be. It would
not be clear what is being studied there.
What can be done? It is beyond the scope of this Article to try to
reform law school. But four tentative observations are in order.
First, technology is not any kind of answer. Technology is a ground
of the death of values. The Internet and its implications encourage
shallow living. 208 Even one-on-one skyping, which I engage in
sometimes to read philosophy communally, has a very different feel
from in-person contact. Online courses will inevitably emphasize
information for a student over transformation of the student.
Second, the death of values is irreversible. It is part of the dead end
of metaphysics that Heidegger saw and announced. 209 But does that
mean that the notion and role of the rule of law must be abandoned? The
Crits suggested that it did years ago and for their trouble they were
invited to leave the legal academy. 210 But they now have their revenge,
when even the legal mainstream is expressly subject to the death of
values.
Yet, I have seen the rule of law provide what seems like a kind of
restraint on arbitrary power. These are valuable traditions—can they still
be relied upon in some way? Or must they be abandoned as relics of a
dead end?
This question should haunt law professors. The title that Heidegger
chose for his meditation on his own failed connection to the Nazi Party,
as well as the world’s situation in 1936-1938, as well as the question of
being—thoughts that of necessity went into a drawer—was the banality,
Contributions to Philosophy. 211 Heidegger explained this choice as
follows: “[A]ll essential titles have become impossible on account of the
exhaustion of every basic word . . . .” 212 What does that teach us about

208. See NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS
(2011).
209. For Heidegger, it was also called the collapse of German idealism: “[T]he age that was no
longer strong enough to stand up to the greatness, breadth and originality of that spiritual
world . . . .” MARTIN HEIDEGGER, INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS, 48 (Gregory Fried & Richard
Polt trans., 2000).
210. Some of the stories of discrimination against members of the Critical Legal Studies
movement—if the term member can be forgiven—are told by Mark V. Tushnet in Critical Legal
Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991).
211. HEIDEGGER, supra note 6.
212. Id. at 5.
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our own basic words—words such as “the rule of law”? Perhaps they
can no longer be used.
Third, law professors must practice candor above everything else.
In contexts in which traditional legal analysis is merely a necessary
charade—something a lawyer would use to dress up a brief—the
professor must admit this and attempt to give a fuller account of the
realities of law. This will return to the law school classroom a sense of
the real. But, will students still come to law school, and will society still
need law schools, when we admit that our stock in trade is not relevant?
We should have begun asking that during the era of legal realism, but we
did not want to admit—or, we truly did not believe—the bankruptcy of
our endeavor. Now, the foundations of law are much shakier than they
were then.
Finally, there is still truth. Significance still comes on the scene.
There is still yearning for liberation and freedom. There is still injustice,
economic and otherwise. There is deadly peril for our nation and for our
planet. Philosophy did not end with Nietzsche. And the American people
have not quite lost their hope for constitutional democracy. Somehow,
we law professors have to learn a new way that reaches out toward these
yearnings and needs—and begins to ask how to be of service. I hope to
attempt a beginning toward a new way in the second part of this
Article—Being in Law School.
If we do begin to learn a new way, then law schools might not stand
so empty.
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